CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

GE.90-61731/2055B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 558th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First, on behalf of the Conference and myself, I should like to warmly welcome the representative of India, Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha, who is with us today. I am pleased to convey to him my congratulations on his appointment and to wish him success in the functions entrusted him by his Government - Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

Today, the Conference is continuing consideration of items 1 and 2 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members who so wish may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on today's list of speakers the representative of the German Democratic Republic and the representative of Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, I have already had the opportunity to warmly welcome in our midst Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner and to wish Ambassador Dimitri Kostov, who left Geneva yesterday, all the best in his future assignment.

May I, with your permission, use this occasion today to bid farewell to two of our outstanding colleagues leaving us soon. Ambassador Luvsandonjiin Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Istvan Varga of Hungary have significantly contributed to the endeavours towards the achievement of the objectives of our Conference. Their great experience and diplomatic skill and their ability to foster personal relations is well known to all of us. We are not only losing two colleagues, we are losing also the dean of the diplomatic corps in the field of disarmament, Ambassador Bayart, who has rendered distinguished service to this Conference during his tenure.

In taking leave of our colleagues, I wish them all success in their future responsibilities, good health and well-being.

Mr. President, my statement today refers to item 4 of the Conference's agenda, i.e. the negotiations on chemical weapons. Like many other members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the German Democratic Republic accords high priority to the conclusion of work on the convention on a general, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date. In order to encourage the speedy continuation of the negotiations on a CW convention and to gain experience in translating the already elaborated parts of the convention into practice, trial inspections were conducted in the German Democratic Republic, also in the field of challenge inspection. The three working papers I should like to introduce

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

today are based on the experience gained by such an inspection in a chemical industry plant. The report on an inspection in the military field will presumably be submitted to you soon.

I should like to offer some explanatory remarks concerning the documents at hand. The inspection was carried out in March of this year in the WOFATOX factory of Chemistry AG, Bitterfeld, a facility producing the organophosphorous pesticide parathion-methyl. The aim of this inspection was to develop and test an inspection methodology for challenge inspections in industrial plants. Inspection procedures and time frames were not the primary objectives of the trial.

The results and preliminary conclusions are set forth in working paper CD/996 entitled "Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection in a Chemical Industry Plant" before you.

A detailed description of the inspection methodology developed is contained in the second document, CD/997, entitled "Inspection Methodology for Challenge Inspections in Industrial Chemical Plants". The approach designed for our trial challenge inspection was a "layered inspection methodology", i.e. a step-by-step approach. More intrusive steps were triggered off by the results of the preceding less-intrusive inspection layers. That approach was considered to allow an inspection team to develop its actual inspection strategy depending on the specific situation at the site. Four such inspection layers were designed.

The third working paper, CD/998, addresses questions concerning chemical analytics and a prototype measuring instrument, i.e. a portable PC-supported ion mobility spectrometer, which was tested in these experiments for verification purposes. This instrument was used in laboratory experiments and in the actual inspection. It was to demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting memory effects in a chemical plant in order to identify residues of former production at trace level.

Thanks to the support of Mrs. Rautio, the prototype instrument was introduced in the Technical Group on Instrumentation last Tuesday and a detailed description was presented to our distinguished experts.

It is not by chance that questions of methodology have been in the focus of our investigations. Thereby, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is continuing the work it commenced on this issue in its working papers CD/CW/WP.198 and 208. We are acting on the assumption that a sound inspection methodology, especially for challenge inspections, can conduce, firstly,

- to carrying out such inspections with a high degree of efficiency and credibility; and secondly,

- to excluding the unjust disclosure of confidential information.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We deem it instrumental that such an inspection methodology, which is founded on objective criteria and applied according to the specific circumstances, ensures the stability of the verification régimes of the CW convention. The elaboration, improvement and streamlining of such verification methodologies will surely be within the responsibility of the future CW organization's technical secretariat. By the working papers at hand, my delegation intends to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of challenge inspections and to help resolve still outstanding problems.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair, presiding over the deliberations of the only negotiating body on disarmament. You represent a country for which Argentina has particular admiration, great affection and respect. We wish you the greatest success.

Mr. President, the resumption of negotiations by the Conference this summer offers a good occasion for some observations on the development of the international scene, particularly as regards aspects relevant to the Conference, as well as for some reflections on the way in which our Conference reacts to the stimuli of the global security context or, perhaps more accurately, why it does not do so to the extent that we would all like to see.

There has been no slackening in the international dynamic since we ended the first part of this year's session - far from it. We have witnessed events tending to confirm a period of change and revision of patterns which seemed to be immutable elements of reality. Meanwhile, another summit meeting of the Presidents of the two States which have major arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons has marked the continuity of dialogue at the highest level on matters of international security.

From the results announced by the press, one may hazard the guess that both super-Powers continue to be reasonably committed to the objective of reducing their nuclear arsenals even further. However, the information at our disposal is scanty and we confess that we are somewhat surprised that the delegations whose Heads of State were the protagonists in such an important international political event have not informed the plenary of the Conference about the results of the summit meeting.

We have been told about a bilateral agreement on chemical weapons and the adoption of a joint declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and missile technology. Beyond that, the Conference on Disarmament knows little. The implications of this fact deserve attention not only from the point of view of the oft-mentioned complementarity of the multilateral and the bilateral system but also, and perhaps much more, when we see that the summit dealt with and agreed on documents in such fields as nuclear testing, which, let us remember, is still the item that heads the agenda of this Conference.

The same can be said about nuclear weapons, an item included in our programme of work for discussion this week. Obviously, such bilateral negotiations are not simple, but we observe with some concern that the targets

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announced by the actors themselves often seem to dwindle in the face of the complexity of reaching the desired goals within the time-limit set.

Thus, to give a concrete example, the oft-repeated commitment to reduce the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union by 50 per cent is now a pre-agreement whose scope is, in fact, limited to 30 per cent, depending on which source or military analyst we may wish to credit for even lower figures are being mentioned.

None the less, it would seem that some important points of convergence have been achieved: rules of counting geographical scope of the systems to be included in the reductions, and verification procedures which look like being even more refined than those of the INF Treaty - the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Undoubtedly, the fact that negotiations are continuing is a positive development and we welcome it. We therefore hope that, as they did during the first part of the session, the heads of the delegations involved in the negotiations on nuclear and space arms will once again give the Conference their analysis of the development and prospects of these bilateral discussions. Similarly, we trust that those delegations will maintain the indispensable tradition of providing the Conference with the official documents from the various negotiating forums.

Without prejudce to the option of speaking again on this subject in greater detail on another occasion, I consider it important to point out that the emergence of two negotiating authorities on the same subject - chemical weapons - one in a multilateral framework and, simultaneously, the other in a bilateral one between the United States and the Soviet Union, is beginning to show some jagged edges that I would venture to describe as disquieting.

No one can doubt that it is a good thing for the two super-Powers to reach agreement on the elimination of weapons. However, in the specific case of chemical weapons, there exists an ongoing intense multilateral process in which many of our countries are investing a significant amount of political energy and willingness to commit ourselves. In view of this reality and of the existence of a rolling text which, given the necessary political will would now be a treaty, it must be noted that bilateral agreements and arrangements are beginning to take shape that are attached like juridical artificial limbs to the general text of the convention, generating a two-track method of negotiation, in which States negotiate with one eye on a table seating 40 States (plus observers) and the other on what may be negotiated in other, more limited forums.

We believe that the trend we are referring to is harmful in that it ultimately legitimizes an implicit veto that reintroduces situations which we thought were a thing of the past in multilateral negotiations on disarmament and which establish categories - perhaps it would be more appropriate to call them hierarchies - of States, depending on whether or not they possess the

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

weapons that are to be eliminated. This is not the approach which, in our view, should be given priority if we are seeking a convention with universal participation.

Mr. President, all these negotiations in parallel, including the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and the European regional negotiations in Vienna, although apparenty unrelated, do have, from a global perspective, an internal logic and coherence which must not be disregarded. This may be seen clearly in the many links existing between the various weapons systems under negotiation.

If one had to identify a single common thread between all of these negotiating processes, it could be found in the fact that all of them, regardless of their results, aim at redefining the framework of international security.

It is already incontrovertible that as security concerns in the European context become a less dominant factor and the relative advantage of the super-Powers - their nuclear supremacy - becomes less and less relevant in the process of change, the maintenance of a system of security based on the presence of two military alliances is doomed to obsolescence. The present structures may persist for a while, longer or shorter, depending on the political will and audacity of the actors involved, but we can have no doubt that a formidable challenge is emerging for the international community which concerns all of our States and from which none of them can stand aloof.

The task now, Mr. President, is to create the architecture of a new network of international relations in the sphere of security. That does not by any means imply a completely unfettered exercise of the imagination. On the contrary, the new dynamic will certainly incorporate important elements of the system that prevailed since the end of the Second World War, but it is also undoubtedy bound to have novel aspects and will therefore give rise to other realities.

And it is here that we think that there is an objective common to the entire international community; it is precisely in this area that the Conference on Disarmament - contrary to what some may regard as its inevitable decay - is called upon to play a relevant role.

This forum, in which countries of the North and the South - like yours and mine - of East and West are participating, has enormous potential at the present juncture. We cannot imagine a different kind of body that would be capable of properly tackling the common security problems that are emerging in a world in which bipolar confrontation is significantly weakening.

The blueprint for a new European security system should not preclude the negotiation of a comprehensive system. To continue with a basically Euro-centric vision of international security could lead us to repeating the dogmatic manoeuvring and political mapmaking which characterized the power pattern of the twentieth century.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

It is time to go forward with the building of a more integrated world, Mr. President. The common problems which unite us are more important and greater than those which divide us: development, economic growth and social justice; scientific and technological co-operation; human rights and the environment; and, in our own area a new standard for disarmament.

Mr. President, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests, naval weapons, the relationship between disarmament and development, are all elements of one reality facing the international community and in dealing with it the Conference on Disarmament should be given a special role.

The interconnection of those elements in the present international panorama appears obvious. Let us look at some examples.

Taking the case of naval nuclear weapons, to which Ambassador Theorin referred just a few days ago, we consider it one that exemplifies the new trends we have mentioned. Concurring with many of the arguments put forward by Sweden, we regard the subject as particularly relevant in that it is associated with what seems to us a clear manifestation of a substitution strategy which, while reducing medium- and short-range nuclear weapons, shifts its weight to sea-launched systems.

Apart from the legitimate concern which my country, like many others, may feel about strategy escalation, there is, in the matter of naval nuclear weapons, the additional destabilizing factor of their mobility and their almost complete undetectability, which, given their range, nature and power, make them a matter of serious concern for many countries, particularly those with long coastlines, like my own.

It appears that the positioning of nuclear weapons is undergoing a physical redistribution in which those responsible for nuclear strategy are opting for the marine environment as the place of choice for such weapons. Mr. President, the Argentine delegation had occasion to mention some of these concerns when, a little less than a year ago, the parties to the Sea-bed Treaty reviewed it for the third time.

On that occasion, our delegation ventured to draw attention to what we regard as a growing imbalance between reductions in land-based weapon sytems and weapon systems based at sea or in space, now or in the future.

The results of bilateral negotiations on the subject and the difficulty of addressing such issues in multilateral forums would seem to confirm this assumption.

With respect to space-based systems, once again we are faced with a group of problems which present serious difficulties in the bilateral context and on which no progress is being made at the multilateral level. The difficulties encountered in bilateral negotiations were clearly explained to this body by distinguished Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin. Nothing would seem to have happened since then to change the picture that they drew for us then.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

The situation, in our view, has been worsened by the evident impossibility of making any progress in the multilateral area either. I would like to dwell on this consideration because it links, as I said at the beginning of my statement, the global problems with the way in which this Conference on Disarmament reacts to the stimulus of situations that undoubtedly require concrete responses at the multilateral level.

Five years ago, the Conference on Disarmament set up a subsidiary body to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This unquestionably was in response to the common view of the members of the Conference that it was desirable to deal, in a more specific and detailed manner than was possible through discussion in plenary, with the problems associated with the militarization of space.

Since then, nothing or vitually nothing has happened in the Conference. Without wishing to reiterate ideas that I voiced when I devoted an entire statement in plenary to this matter, I would say that that is not exactly due to the fact that delegations see such inaction as connected with a comforting conclusion that space is exempt from any kind of activity that would be potentially destabilizing from a military point of view.

In my opinion, there is an unexploited area of consensus here - no doubt partial in scope but none the less significant - by way of confidence-building measures applied to space.

Unfortunately, going round in circles seems to have some faithful supporters in the Conference, and the first meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee tend to confirm that the frustrating experiences of earlier sessions have to be repeated in 1990.

Another item, Mr. President, where reality outside the Conference and its negotiating activity contrast, although this time with the same tone of irrelevance, is that of nuclear tests.

At the bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union have at long last agreed on the details relating to verification of the Threshold Agreements of the early seventies. This should now enable their respective legislative bodies to ratify the treaties, whose real impact on military-strategy matters, in our opinion, is nil.

This Conference on Disarmament, meanwhile, accompanies that process without reaching agreement on the terms of a mandate whose features in any case ensure that a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban would be far from imminent.

At the same time, the process of the Amendment Conference of the Moscow Treaty is moving foward, providing further evidence of the way in which the Conference on Disarmament has put itself on the sidelines on this issue.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

Mr. President, it will be obvious to any observer that, like many other existing institutional bodies, the Conference on Disarmament, must, in view of dramatic and rapid changes and the evolution taking place in the premises on which its work was based overcome its present bewilderment and set itself a clear course.

The international disarmament agenda now paradoxically requires the Conference to play a perhaps more meaningful role in the future.

An unbiased look at our agenda may also well be in order. Subjects such as the nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space must be dealt with appropriately. Others, whether from the "decalogue" or from our own collective wish, could no doubt be added. We referred a while ago to the question of naval disarmament.

In this rapid review of topics, we also deem it appropriate to mention the relationship between disarmament and development, or, in a broader sense, the whole range of subjects which may be regarded as generically related to the economic and social consequences of agreements on disarmament and arms control. At a time when references to "peace dividends" are part of the daily language of military and economic analysts, any collective analysis emerging from the Conference on Disarmemnt acquires special significance.

Mr. President, in this rather long statement, we have endeavoured to focus our attention on the future and have tried to point out, albeit in a somewhat disjointed fashion, the directions in which the Conference should be heading.

The inaction of the Conference on Disarmament is certainly not in the interests of anyone - neither of the States among us which are not major military Powers nor should it be in the interests of those States which possess nuclear and chemical weapons or the capacity to use space for military purposes.

The sterilization of the only multilateral forum for negotiations on security and disarmament at a time of historic changes and weaking of bipolar confrontation is exactly what must be avoided.

It is our hope, Mr. President that this conviction may provoke a consensus of the 40 States represented here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my country and to the Chair.

I have no other speakers on today's list. Does some other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

Members of the Conference, the Secretariat has circulated at my request a time-table of the meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. It has been prepared, as always, in consultation with the

(The President)

chairman of the Ad Hoc committees. As to the work of the plenary, in addition to the two regular plenary meetings, the Conference will, immediately after the plenary on Tuesday, build an informal meeting on the substantive aspects of agenda item 3. As indicated in the timetable the open-ended informal consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference will continue on 28 June at 3.30 p.m. in this room. Of course, the proposed time-table is merely indicative and can be modified if circumstances so require. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this indicative time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As I have no other business before me, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 June, at 10. a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

GE.90-61779/2059B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 559th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First, allow me, on behalf of the Conference and of myself, to express to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran our deep-felt condolences on the tragedy afflicting his country. The magnitude of the disaster, especially the appalling loss of human life, has stirred the international community and strengthened the feelings of humanitarian solidarity which bind us to all men in such grave emergencies as that affecting the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is comforting to find that that humanitarian solidarity is being demonstrated not only in words but also in deeds, by material assistance and co-operation to relieve the sufferings of the victims of the catastrophe.

I should now like to proceed to our work and begin by warmly welcoming His Excellency, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who is listed to speak at today's meeting. This is the fourth visit of the Under-Secretary of State to the Conference. I thank him for the interest with which he is following our efforts as well as for the contributions which his country has been making to the work of the Conference, in particular in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in which Finland chairs the technical group on instrumentation.

The Conference continues its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members who wish to do so may make statements on any other matter related to the work of the Conference.

I wish to remind members that today the Conference will be holding its second informal meeting on the substantive aspects of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

On today's list of speakers I have the representatives of Finland and the United Kingdom. I now give the floor to His Excellency, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, the challenge of disarmament is global. Political and military changes are sweeping all regions of the world. The Conference on Disarmament is charged with the demanding and complex task of bringing together the interests of the whole international community in some of the most urgent issues of international security.

All efforts should be intensified to resolve regional conflicts and disputes, for they feed the alarming arms competition that we are witnessing today in many such crisis areas. A new confidence on the global scale is needed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, prevent the spread of chemical weapons and reach a global ban on such weapons. These measures, we hope, should help to stop the arms race and bring about effective disarmament.

A real disarmament process is well under way in Europe. The deep division into two antagonistic blocs is withering. This is giving place to new security structures. The CSCE is becoming the focus as the truly all-European security framework. The "summit" of the 35 CSCE States towards

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

the end of this year will mark a milestone in the continuing process of building a better political order in Europe by peaceful and stable means.

Mr. President, we cannot exclude the possibility that these changes will sooner or later affect what have been regarded as lasting elements of international security. It is widely believed that nuclear weapons have contributed to stability between the two bloc systems. With East-West tensions subsiding, the balance of terror may not be the only alternative to help mankind survive. We could ask ourselves whether we are coming to an end of an era which euphemistically has been called "Pax atomica"? Everyone seems to agree that nuclear armaments will have a lesser role in the future. If that is so, how are the nuclear-weapon States responding to such a vision? And what measures should the international community take to encourage and facilitate nuclear disarmament?

Four weeks ago, the United States and the Soviet Union took another significant step by issuing a joint declaration on strategic offensive arms. Hopes were rekindled that the first START Treaty will see the light of day before the end of this year. And what is equally important, the Soviet Union and the United States also confirmed that there will be further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of the two countries. Finland welcomes this progress in the negotiations between the leading nuclear Powers.

Another category of nuclear weapons is rapidly ripening for negotiation. Progress in the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces, along with the political change in Eastern and Central Europe, is rendering short-range nuclear weapons obsolete. Unilateral decisions concerning their withdrawal or non-modernization are signs which, we hope, contain the message that there is no turning back.

A forecast for naval nuclear disarmament seems less clear. Finland shares the view that sea-based nuclear systems must not become a means of circumventing disarmament agreements elsewhere. Nor should naval forces be left outside the growing openness in military matters. Finland has appealed for the total elimination of long-range sea-based nuclear weapons since the prospect of their large-scale deployment first emerged. Prompted by recent findings concerning the risks and low military value of sub-strategic nuclear weapons at sea, the nuclear Powers should, in Finland's view, seriously consider getting rid of that entire category.

Mr. President, in less than two months the representatives of the States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will gather here in Geneva to review the functioning of that Treaty. In Finland's view, the NPT remains a cornerstone in multilateral disarmament efforts. The non-proliferation régime needs the continuing support of all the Parties to the NPT in order to be further strengthened. They must perceive it as corresponding to their security needs also in the future. At the same time, the way should be paved for new accessions, to make the Treaty truly universal.

Here I would like to commend the efforts of Egypt in pointing out the need for dialogue with non-parites. I would also like to greet the proposal made by you, Mr. President, to organize consultations between 1990 and 1995 to ensure the prolongation and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These are goals that Finland fully shares.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

The NPT Review Conference will discuss all elements of the Treaty, including proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament. It cannot be denied that the perils of proliferation are still with us. But they also serve as a reminder of what we might be facing without the Treaty.

In the period under review, however, nuclear disarmament has made an unequivocal turn for the better. The nuclear-weapon States will have a record to show on this score. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was made for a less than perfect world. Despite its shortcomings, it has greatly enhanced international security. No better treaty is in sight.

Mr. President, nuclear test explosions continue to be a divisive issue in international disarmament discussion. It took the leading nuclear Powers a decade and a half to agree on how to verify the "threshold" treaties. Meanwhile, non-nuclear weapon States have in vain made efforts to make the commonly agreed goal of a comprehensive test ban more attainable. Positions have hardened and frustrations grown.

Finland remains firmly committed to the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty as a strong priority of the international community. We regard a comprehensive, universal and verifiable test ban as the surest way to slow down the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In our view, the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty should be utilized as a unique opportunity for the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States to embark on a common road leading to test ban. Realistically thinking it will not be a freeway, but the common goal should be reconfirmed and negotiations begun without delay. Fresh ideas from all sides would help loosen and perhaps open the knots.

It is Finland's view that nuclear texting has never been a matter for the nuclear-weapon States only. Environmental concerns, inter alia, contributed to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. New evidence suggests that there is no such thing as environmentally safe underground testing either. Safety measures at the test sites are being questioned by countries which fear that they get their share of radioactive particles from test explosions. In Finland's opinion, the best way to dispel such doubts would be for independent experts to be invited to familiarize themselves with safety measures at the test sites.

Within the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) at the Conference on Disarmament the building and testing of the seismic network for the verification of underground nuclear tests as well as all kinds of seismic events will continue. The results from the on-going GSE Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) will give valuable information on how to further develop the seismic methods and their transmission, which is the truly global way to manage test-ban verification. However, eyes should be kept open also to complementary verification and control methods if they can help to increase the reliability of test-ban supervision.

Mr. President, the bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons, which

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was signed at the Washington summit, is a timely one. It is self-evident that the countries with the largest arsenals should be the first in the disarmament process. By starting the gradual elimination of their chemical weapons these two countries are assuming in earnest their responsibility for the successful conclusion of the CW negotiations in this Conference.

The commitment by the United States and the Soviet Union to work for an early conclusion of the global CW convention and to give precedence to the provisions of that convention over the terms of their own bilateral agreement should be a catalyst to our efforts. It is now up to the international community as a whole to make sure that the precedence given to the global convention will in practice lead to a faster rather than to a slower timetable for the destruction of existing stocks in their entirety.

Finland has consistently emphasized that the commitment to destroy all chemical weapons within the 10 year period should be unconditional. We have also felt that an attempt to determine who is CW-capable and who is not may become a wild-goose chase which can only be satisfactorily solved when all countries are included. If completion of the destruction is linked to the findings of a conference close to the end of the 10 year period, a degree of uncertainty of the final outcome would prevail, unless participation is universal from the beginning. In the latter case, examination of the participation of the convention would become a theoretical exercise and all parties could be assured of total destruction of chemical weapons from the outset. Consequently, universality and its achievement is a vital goal, which we have to keep in mind when we discuss the details.

For many countries, as for Finland, the chemical weapons convention is primarily a security treaty which deals with weapons, not with chemicals as such or with industrial development. For these countries, the convention has to provide for increased or, as a minimum, undiminished security either in their particular setting or in general. However, for a larger number of countries chemical weaponry is not a primary factor. When they join, they are, however, equally subjected to intrusive inspections and have to pay their share of the costs of the organization. If we are to achieve universality, the convention has to be made attractive to this latter group of countries as well. Hence there is a necessity to include in the Convention also a component, such as article XI, which provides the necessary incentive to join. It cannot be disregarded either that for a number of countries for whom the security concerns are of primary importance, article XI provides an important additional incentive.

For its own part Finland intends to be among the original parties to the convention.

Mr. President, I would like now to deal in more detail with a number of specific aspects of the future convention.

As is well known in this Conference, Finland has for a long time centred its own activities on verification analysis and instrumentation. We have been glad to see that interest in these technical issues has been growing rapidly

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

during the last year or so. Meetings of the Technical Group on Instrumentation seem to become a regular part of the work programme rather than remain isolated events. There is also a growing tendency to increase national resources devoted to CW verification research.

It is often said that once the remaining political issues are resolved, the other pieces will fall into place. But it is also true that the speed of dealing with these other pieces is largely determined by the technical credibility of the proposed verification régime. Many of the technical details can and indeed must be left to the Preparatory Commission. Nevertheless, before that can be done there must be a clear understanding of the technical requirements of the convention and of the ways to meet them reliably.

As a first attempt to test and possibly improve the reliability of the analytical methods that the verification mechanism depends on, 10 laboratories organized an international inter-laboratory comparison test, a so-called round-robin test, last autumn. The Finnish Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament acted as the co-ordinating laboratory of that test. A summary of the results of that test was circulated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last April (CD/CW/WP.288). The full account of all the findings has been prepared and will be circulated shortly in the Blue Book series. A second round-robin test with more laboratories participating will be conducted later this year. It is our view that comparison tests of this kind should in time become routine exercises in international methods development.

The second novel activity that Finland has been engaged in is the training programme on CW verification methods for analytical chemists from developing countries. The first four-month long course was completed in May this year. I am glad to report that the course surpassed our highest expectations. That, of course, is as much due to the dedication and enthusiasm of the participants, who came from Brazil, Kenya and Pakistan, as to the organizers themselves. A detailed report of the experiences gained during the programme will be prepared for the Blue Book series next year on the basis of experience gathered from three courses by then.

The second training course will start in the coming August. The invitation to nominate candidates for next year's two courses was circulated some time ago and we hope to receive the nominations before 15 September. I can also add that, as of next year, we will be able to increase the number of participants in these courses so as to reach eight chemists per year.

Finland fully shares the concern of the international community of the spread of chemical weapons. We have passed new legislation to control the export of CW precursors. This new legislation which enters into force next month covers a list of 37 precursors under export-licensing requirements. Thirteen additional precursor chemicals will be placed on a warning list. As appears from the Finnish data relevant to the CW convention as provided to the Conference (CD/CW/WP.297) there is no production in Finland of any of the scheduled substances, except in laboratory quantities for protective and research purposes. There are only four facilities altogether which use five of the Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals in their processes.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Mr. President, the detailed structure of the technical secretariat of the future organization has not yet been subject to discussion. However, with regard to the laboratory side of the organization we have worked on the assumption that there will be a need for a central laboratory and a global network of other designated laboratories. The central laboratory would be the primary tool of the technical secretariat for organizing the necessary analytical work, for maintaining the high quality standards, and for any research and development programmes the organization may wish to undertake. The designated laboratories would perform the duties which in the present rolling text are assigned to off-site laboratories.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Government of Finland has made the offer to place our own existing verification laboratory at the disposal of the future organization for use as the central laboratory.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to associate myself with your words of condolence for the terrible suffering of the people of Iran in recent days. Our deep sympathy goes out to them.

Mr. President, may I express my pleasure at having you as President of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. It is good to have your experienced leadership of our deliberations. May I also warmly welcome the newly arrived ambassadors to this Conference. I look forward to working closely with them.

Mr. President, as members of the Conference on Disarmament will be aware a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held at Turnberry in the United Kingdom on 7 and 8 June. On behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom, I arranged for circulation of the text of the document issued by that meeting and it has been circulated today as document CD/1006.

The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council will be followed by that of the Heads of State and Government in July in London.

The document of the Foreign Ministers consists of two parts: a short message, followed by a more detailed final communiqué. Whilst I would urge delegates to read the text in full, it might be helpful for me to draw attention to some of the major points.

The Foreign Ministers of the Alliance express their determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order based on freedom, justice and democracy. They extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and co-operation. They stress the importance of mutual acknowledgement of the legitimate security interests of all States and welcome the positive spirit of the declaration issued by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow on 7 June and introduced as a CD document by my distinguished Soviet colleague last week.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The Foreign Ministers urge that the arms-control process must be vigorously pursued. They examine in some detail ways in which this can and should be done.

The Ministers strongly emphasize that they attach the highest priority to the conclusion this year of a conventional forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Allied Governments will continue to work for substantive results in the confidence and security-building measures negotiations, in the form of an agreement later this year. Such positive results would lay the necessary basis for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe summit this year. As soon as a CFE agreement is reached, the NATO allies will be prepared to undertake follow-on negotiations to further enhance security and stability in Europe. The ministers endorse the United States President's recent proposal that negotiations on United States and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons systems in Europe begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded.

The Ministers welcome the progress attained in the United States/USSR Summit held in Washington from 31 May to 3 June and, in particular, the agreement on major outstanding issues concerning the START treaty that will result in deep reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear weapons, as well as agreement to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces after the current treaty is completed. Ministers take special note of the progress represented by the signature at the Summit Meeting of verification protocols for treaties limiting nuclear tests.

Of particular relevance to our work here in Geneva for a chemical weapons convention is the solemn statement made by Ministers that "all allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the [chemical weapons] convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other States to undertake a similar commitment".

Ministers express satisfaction with the United States/USSR Agreement that will drastically reduce both sides' stocks of chemical weapons. They believe that this will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention being negotiated here in Geneva, which remains a goal of all members of NATO. Ministers also reaffirm their determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and all missiles capable of carrying such weapons.

The realization of the unity of Germany has always been a primary goal of our Alliance and the Turnberry Communiqué contains an important statement on this question. Ministers stress that a united Germany must have the right, recognized in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose to be a party to a treaty of alliance. European stability, as well as the wishes of the German people, require that a unified Germany be a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance. The security guarantee provided by articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty will extend to all the territory of a united Germany. The Allies seek no unilateral advantage from German unity and are prepared to demonstrate this, taking into account legitimate Soviet security interests. A free and democratic Germany will be an essential element of a peaceful order in Europe in which no State need harbour fears for its security against its neighbours.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Ministers recognize that the developments which we are now witnessing in Europe, and of which the Allies have been and will continue to be among the principal architects, are producing far-reaching changes in the political and military fundamentals of European security, and consequently in the conditions under which our Alliance is required to work. The principles of Alliance security were set out in May 1989 in the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament (issued here as document CD/926). These principles remain the basis for our assessment of the implications of the changing situation in Europe for our strategy. The Allies accept that whilst ensuring that the permanent principles which form the basis of our alliance and guarantee its effectiveness are preserved, we must today adapt it to the enormous changes now taking place. This process has already begun. Although the prevention of war will always remain the fundamental task of the Alliance, the changing European environment now require of it a broader approach to security, based as much on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to me.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the floor.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I take the floor at this juncture of chagrin and deep sorrow for my country and my people to express our sincere and deep appreciation for the words of sympathy and condolences expressed here in the Conference on Disarmament to the grieving families who have lost everything including their best and beloved ones in this devastating tragedy. As you rightly mentioned, Mr. President, the magnitude of the disaster is so great and beyond any imagination that only the solidarity and sympathy of the international community, extended in the form of expression of condolences and relief support to the afflicted people, will alleviate some of the sorrow and grief. We are thankful to all countries, relief organizations and individuals, who have expedited humanitarian aid to the mourning families.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no other business before me and I shall therefore adjourn this plenary meeting.

As I have announced, immediately following the plenary meeting, there will be the informal meeting scheduled for today on agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 28 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.560
28 June 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

GE.90-61823/2081B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 560th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may make a statement on any other matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The present session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held at a turning-point in world development. These are not just idle words but a momentous reality. The world is undergoing headlong change, in a way that can truly be called revolutionary. Today, more happens in one year than formerly in decades, and more in one month than in years. Before our very eyes, walls are collapsing, seemingly inviolable lines of confrontation are eroding, new States are emerging and the political map of the world is changing - as a result not of wars, as in the past, but of peaceful, democratic development. These changes are affecting not only Europe but also other regions of the world, where the ideas of democracy, freedom, justice and equal rights are asserting themselves, although not without difficulties, sometimes major difficulties.

Profound changes are also taking place in the Soviet Union. Our perestroika, which began five years ago, has assumed an irreversible character. At the same time, it has revealed such fundamental contradictions in society, accumulated over decades, that all of its structures, both horizontal and vertical, have begun to experience tremendous strains. It is now obvious that these structures cannot be left untouched since they have become a hindrance to the renewal of society and are undermining the foundations of its progress and stability.

The complexity of the problems that we have to solve at home is not making us want to fence ourselves off from the rest of the world. One of the imperatives of perestroika is to overcome the psychology of autarky, of self-isolation and exclusiveness, and to create an open society.

The changes taking place in the world and in our country are of an objective nature and historically conditioned. No one can halt them or slow them down. But any change also has a potential for instability. That is why we are seeking to find the optimum combination of renewal and stability. Stability is not synonymous with ossification of old structures. What has outlived its time must be sent to the scrap-heap of history, but in a way that does not harm the emergence of the new. In this context, now more than ever, what is needed in relations between States are confidence and mutual respect,

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and, in politics, a transition from passive mutual understanding to active interaction and businesslike partnership with a view to maintaining dynamic stability under rapidly changing conditions.

Another important reason for ensuring stability is that the world today still carries the burden of over-armament characterized by huge arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Our country, too, has accumulated a large amount of weapons. We are fully conscious of the responsibility that this imposes upon us. For a whole series of domestic reasons and foreign-policy considerations, the Soviet Union is now no less interested than other States - possibly even more so - in the steady advancement of the arms control and disarmament process. However, disarmament is, of course, not an end in itself but only one of the means for building the secure, democratic and civilized world which we need and part of which we wish to be. But without disarmament it is impossible to create a new world order and new security structures.

Never during the entire post-war period has the possibility of a drastic weakening of the levers of military force in world politics been so close as today. A general consensus has already developed that the threat of war has receded into the past and that a unique chance is appearing of building a qualitatively new world, based on normal, civilized relations between States and groups of States. The prospects that have emerged at the Vienna and Geneva negotiations are opening up the possibility of the progressive dismantling of the security model which developed in the years of the "cold war" and which was based primarily on military confrontation. As we understand it, our Western negotiating partners are proceeding, in principle, on the same assumption.

If in the near future - this very year, we hope - we succeed as a result of negotiations in arriving at agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States, and on removing the potential for surprise attack from the arsenals of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO conventional armed forces, that will radically improve the entire situation on the European continent and in the world as a whole, have a multi-dimensional constructive effect on East-West relations and be a sign that the post-war period of confrontation is over. Evidently, it will then be possible to speak of the irreversibility of a fundamental improvement in the world situation, a decisive turning-point in the matter of disarmament, and the beginning of a real shift from over-armament to reasonable sufficiency for defence.

The Vienna talks are undoubtedly of special importance for European security and stability. Assessment of the present state of affairs in Vienna makes it possible to identify a high degree of agreement among the 23 participants on a number of questions of principle, including those relating to the conceptual approach to the structure of the initial understanding. At the same time, there are still many questions of substance to be settled, not to mention a multitude of technical details. We are concerned that in the 35-party negotiations agreement has not yet been reached on a new generation of confidence-building measures that would include, in

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particular, activities of naval and air forces, although some progress is being seen on other elements of the subject-matter of those negotiations. Nevertheless, the Vienna talks have entered their decisive and, we hope, final stage. At this stage of the work, it becomes particularly important to take fully into account both collective interests and the interests and concerns of each State. The situation would prove difficult to redress if, at this stage of the negotiations, emotions prevailed over common sense and the conclusion of an all-important treaty were frustrated or indefinitely postponed.

It must be clearly realized that delay in Vienna in finding solutions to the remaining problems - and they could be enumerated: personnel, aviation, definitions of the main categories of arms, regional division, verification and elimination procedures - may have a braking effect on the entire all-European process, especially as the Vienna treaty is one of the key items of the all-European summit meeting to be held at the end of the year.

It is now becoming increasingly clear: the political situation in Europe is developing so quickly that it is already beginning to outdistance the disarmament process.

Of course, it is the German question that now constitutes the crux of European security and stability. Today, no one can have any doubt that Germany will become an important component of united Europe, making a major contribution to the construction of the common European home and the single all-European spaces - economic, ecological, legal and humanitarian. Moreover, in the circumstances that have arisen the process of Germany's unification can and must become a stimulus - and the new united German State, an engine - of profound qualitative changes in Europe organized on the principles of joint security, confidence and good-neighbourliness.

But there is something else that is true. A united Germany will not fit into the landscape of a new Europe if, in Europe, everything remains as before. In such a case, German unity could upset the balance of forces established over the previous decades and lead to an aggravation of contradictions. We consider the isolation of Germany undesirable, and we are in favour of joint efforts aimed at creating dependable structures of peace.

The leaders of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty declared, at a meeting of their Political Consultative Committee, that the organization would have to undergo very profound changes if it wished to play a constructive role in the further development and improvement of the European structures of co-operation and security. Our alliance has embarked on the path of radical transformation of its activities in all fields, including the military field. We have proposed to the NATO States that they should start moving in a similar direction, and we note with satisfaction that we have heard a positive response from Turnberry. As we begin this movement, we must bear in mind that not only is its direction important, but even more so are the dynamics and the magnitude of the accompanying changes. In this connection, we are looking forward with great attention to the decisions of NATO's London session.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

As new joint security structures are moulded in the continent and the world as a whole, nuclear arms too must be looked at anew. We put forward the ideal of a nuclear-free world, and we remain true to it. But we recognize that we are not living in an ideal world. The huge arsenals of nuclear weapons have become so firmly established in security systems that the idea of eliminating them at a stroke is unrealistic. Nuclear disarmament is only part of a far broader phased process involving deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms and the modification of their structure on the basis of non-offensive defence, as well as the establishment of machinery to ensure openness and monitoring, not only to guarantee the implementation of disarmament through all the facets of this process, but also to create a relaxed atmosphere in relations between States. And, lastly, radical changes in East-West relations generally, the progressive replacement of instruments for maintaining peace by military force by security guarantees in the political, economic, humanitarian and environmental fields and their enshrinement in appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements. Such an approach will require us to progressively overcome the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, an organic component of the system of international security which was established after the Second World War, and which we want to rid outselves of within the foreseeable future.

Today, as never before, this doctrine deserves detailed, impartial consideration. On the one hand, it is impregnated with the concept of the ennemy, the idea of mutual intimidation and competition in stockpiling nuclear weapons. It somehow absorbs into itself - or rather into the instruments of its implementation - all the weight of the stereotypes of mutual mistrust, suspicion, animosity and false, often grotesque perceptions about each other, which were built up during the long years of the "cold war". On the other hand, as long as these stereotypes and perceptions are not overcome, the doctrine of deterrence gives some countries a sense of security. Perhaps it is a misleading feeling similar to being under the influence of drugs. But it would be rash to deprive people of a sense of security, even if the security is imaginary, without giving them something in exchange. Finally, one must recognize that sometimes we were guilty of a simplistic approach to this doctrine and turned a blind eye to the fact that, in a given historical context, this doctrine did play a useful role in maintaining peace. To put it in a nutshell, I think it would be impossible to overcome this psychological barrier in a single leap and do away with nuclear weapons, as some suggest, unless humanity can see that the world it is entering will be more secure than the one it is leaving behind. In the present conditions building a nuclear-free world certainly cannot be understood as a simple return to the pre-nuclear world with all its problems, contradictions and threats. In this context the achievement of a level of "minimal deterrence" seems for the moment to be a realistic stage on the way to a nuclear-free world. This will lead to the elimination of the most dangerous dimensions of the doctrine of deterrence while maintaining the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons themselves. The first steps in this direction have been taken. These include not only the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but also the achievements in the elimination and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

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One of the main results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington is that it created conditions for finalizing the treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. Almost no one, it seems, now harbours any doubt that the treaty will be signed by the end of the year. After that it will be discussed in the highest legislative bodies of the two countries. At the same time the treaty on strategic offensive weapons is already attracting great attention, and its agreed provisions are being carefully analysed. Indeed, it is already drawing criticism. Yet despite all the differences in the assessment of the treaty, almost nobody now questions the view that it will become an important milestone, both in the history of arms control and in relations between the USSR and the United States. Of course, there have been earlier periods in Soviet-American relations when important bilateral agreements in the military and strategic field were signed. But they resulted only in the containment of the arms race in specific areas, and some limitation of the military rivalry between the USSR and the United States. It is a fact that the 1960s saw a rapid build-up of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while the 1970s and 1980s saw even more rapid growth in the aggregate number of warheads as a result of the installation of multiple independently targetted warheads on these missiles. That growth was not halted either by the interim agreement on SALT I (1972), nor by the SALT II treaty (1979) - which of course does not diminish the unquestionable value of these agreements.

Should a Soviet-American treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms be concluded, for the first time in the history of the development of the strategic triad the steady build-up of all its three components will be halted and, over a seven-year period, both the number of strategic delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and the number of nuclear warheads will be reduced. That would mark the beginning of a process of real reduction of strategic arms, an extremely substantial reduction measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of warheads. Even more importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less likely. That will result in increased stability and a lessened threat of war.

It should be pointed out that with the beginning of the START negotiations substantial changes took place in the military programmes of the USSR and the United States, moving towards a reduction in the quantity of the arms concerned deployed and the postponement of the move to new arms systems. The number of new military programmes has also plummeted. The draft treaty provides for substantial quantitative and qualitative limitations to be imposed on the modernization of strategic offensive arms. For instance, limitations are fixed for the aggregate throw weight of ballistic missiles and the maximum number of warheads on these missiles; new types of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs and new types of ballistic missile launchers are banned; and ALCMs with multiple independently targetable warheads are banned. Many other limitations and bans are also provided for. Overall it can be said that for its own purposes the draft treaty resolves the problem of limiting the modernization of strategic offensive arms.

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Although the treaty on strategic offensive arms will not contain a direct limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles, each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs, and subsequently, each year for the entire duration of the treaty, will provide unilateral declarations regarding its plans for deployment of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e. those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. These declarations will be politically binding. The annual declarations will specify the years in which the treaty is in force, with the condition that the number declared must not exceed 880 units. The reductions and limitations spelt out in the treaty will be accompanied by far-reaching verification measures, including the conduct of 12 kinds of on-site inspection on a basis of reciprocity, the use of national technical means of verification, with a ban on interference with them and on denial of access of telemetric information, and the regular exchange of data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of strategic offensive arms. In order to promote achievement of the aims of the treaty, the sides will set up a joint compliance and inspection commission.

We understand that the parties' strategic armaments structures which will remain in place after reductions under the treaty may not fully correspond with the views of the two sides as to strategic stability. However, we view this as an additional argument in favour of an immediate start to negotiations on the next stage of reductions in strategic offensive arms once the treaty being prepared has been concluded.

The determination of the USSR and the United States, as recorded in the special joint statement signed during the Washington summit, to hold consultations without delay after treaty signature regarding future talks on nuclear and space arms and on the further strengthening of strategic stability, and to begin these negotiations at the earliest practical date, is of course of no less importance than the treaty itself. Indeed, a balanced and objective assessment of the treaty can be provided only within the broad context of the intention of the two countries, explicitly stated at the Washington summit, to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament, for which the treaty provides the necessary pre-conditions.

According to the joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and further enhancing strategic stability, the USSR and the United States have agreed to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Their objectives are to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. In these new negotiations emphasis will be placed on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In evaluating the significance of the future treaty on strategic offensive arms it is also important to keep in mind that without one the USSR and the United States could have more than twice as many IBMs and SLBMs and

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could considerably increase the number of heavy bombers armed with nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Nor would there be any limitations on the planned deployment of nuclear SLCMs. In the context of such a large-scale approach to strategic arms reductions, strategic stability becomes considerably more sensitive to non-strategic nuclear arms, both land-based and sea-launched.

The elimination of imbalances and asymmetries in conventional armed forces in Europe under the treaty being negotiated in Vienna would open up a realistic prospect for fairly radical reductions in land-based tactical nuclear weapons to the level of "minimal deterrence". What that level will be remains to be determined in the course of negotiations. It is clear, though, that when reduced to that level the capabilities of the sides should be limited to the deterrent function and should not create the perception on the part of the other side that they may be used in a first strike, including their use for the purpose of initiating hostilities involving conventional forces. I would like to remind the distinguished participants in the Conference that in that direction as well we have already begun to move unilaterally. In 1989 500 nuclear warheads were withdrawn from the territories of our allies - 166 aviation warheads, 50 artillery warheads and 284 missile warheads. In the past two years we have not modernized our tactical nuclear missiles by means of replacement or by other means.

In order to create a favourable climate for negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union proposes to begin as early as this autumn, we have decided to reduce our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe further. Specifically: by the end of this year in Central Europe, the USSR will cut 60 launchers of tactical missiles, i.e. missiles with a shorter range than those being eliminated under the INF Treaty. In the Soviet Union these missiles include the "R-17" or "Scud-B" (300 kilometres), the "Tochka" or "SS-21" (70 kilometres) and the "Luna" or "Frog" (70 kilometres). Moreover, in Central Europe over 250 pieces of nuclear-capable artillary will be cut. These include heavy artillary of 152 mm calibre and above. Finally, 1,500 nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from that zone. This includes nuclear warheads from missiles subject to reductions, nuclear artillary shells and gravity bombs. However, the USSR is not limiting the sphere of its unilateral reductions to Central Europe only. In the European region the USSR will cut a total of 140 tactical missile launchers and 3,200 nuclear-capable artillary pieces by the end of this year.

We are taking these steps unilaterally without making them subject to any pre-conditions, although we believe that they create favourable conditions for the forthcoming negotations on tactical nuclear weapons. We also note certain steps with regard to the removal of tactical nuclear warheads from the European continent taken by NATO in recent years, and we view positively President G. Bush's decision to abandon the "Lance" programme and cancel any further modernization of munitions for United States nuclear artillary deployed in Europe. We would still prefer a decision on the complete elimination of both short-range missiles and all other categories of tactical nuclear weapons, including their nuclear components. However, if NATO

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countries are not ready for such a radical solution to the issue at the present time, we could also consider the possibility of an intermediate stage, that is, an asymmetric reduction to the lowest possible level.

The limitation and reduction of sea-based nuclear weapons constitute a significant problem directly related to the task of ensuring a level of "minimum nuclear deterrence". Unless that problem is resolved, efforts in other areas of nuclear disarmament are likely to be devalued, since broad prospects will open up for an intensive rechannelling of military rivalry to that area of the nuclear arms race, outflanking future agreements. In this respect we note the comprehensive statements made on this topic in our Conference by the distinguished representative of Sweden, the Chairman of the Disarmanent Commission, Ambassador M.B. Theorin of Sweden, and the distinguished representative of Finland, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs A. Karhilo, as well as the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán.

We have proposed to the United States a start on negotations on the phased reduction and elimination of sea-based nuclear weapons (this means not just SLBMs); the elimination of all nuclear weapons on surface ships could be dealt with in the first phase of these talks. Moreover, the talks should produce a definite solution to the problem of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, which should also be eliminated. This could of course lead to the establishment of "minimal nuclear deterrence" at sea.

As applied to land-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the concept of "minimal deterrence" is of course a relative one, and can be viewed as merely an intermediate phase on the path to complete elimination of such weapons. After all, minimal deterrence, in all probability, implies at the same time as high a "nuclear" threshold as possible, whereas in objective terms this threshold will become lower as non-strategic nuclear weapons are introduced into the parties' nuclear arsenals.

Returning to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, you will probably also recall that it emerged in specific historical circumstances and in a specific regional context. The ground is now being prepared for the establishment of new conditions in this region which should enable everyone to take a new look at the role of nuclear weapons as well. It took four decades of confrontation, several crises, every one of which might have been the last one, an irretrievable waste of enormous resources and finally the realization of the necessity to build relations between States on a qualitatively new basis, to make it possible for such a statement to be made. And it would be a very grave mistake if the theory of nuclear deterrence or a theory of deterrence based on other types of weapons of mass destruction, began to gain force and to materialize in other regions of the world as well.

A serious cause of the continuing threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons lies not in the fact that the efforts of the USSR and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament are allegedly insufficiently effective as yet, but rather in a growing potential for instability and a high

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concentration of non-nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. In this respect the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an integrated problem and is linked with the search for solutions to other regional disarmament issues (in particular, non-proliferation of chemical weapons, missiles and missile technology, limitations on the arms trade, etc.), as well as the reduction of tension in zones of potential conflict and crisis situations. At the summit meeting the USSR and the United States adopted a comprehensive statement setting out specific avenues for interaction between them in various of these areas, as well as for co-operation with other countries. It reflects a common recognition of the fact that the accelerating process of arms reduction must be strengthened with measures aimed at countering the spread of weapons throughout the world. The USSR and the United States have also made substantial efforts to settle regional conflicts.

Where nuclear disarmament issues are concerned, our forum, that is to say the Conference on Disarmament, has so far been left out of the picture. In dealing with actual multilateral nuclear disarmament, the Conference is undoubtedly the very place where negotiations should be held. But three nuclear States say that pending the emergence of certain conditions, they are not prepared to join in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This does not mean that conceptual work must not be pursued, let us say at the same informal meetings of ours. In this respect I would also like to draw attention to a particular nuclear disarmament issue, the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In essence, such a ban would be the most radical and the shortest path to the elimination of nuclear weapons, for in the mean time the destruction of launchers alone is being negotiated, and warheads remain in States' arsenals. Therefore, strictly speaking, mankind has not yet embarked on nuclear disarmament proper, and this is a matter for justified concern on the part of the world community. The cessation of the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium would inevitably lead to cuts in the actual industrial base for making key components of nuclear weapons. We believe that an objectively favourable situation now exists for the solution of this issue: in the United States the production of weapons-grade plutonium has virtually stopped; in the Soviet Union the production of weapons-grade uranium was halted in 1989, three reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium have been shut down and a programme has been adopted to decommission all plutonium reactors of this type by the year 2000. Hence we may certainly raise the point here that in these circumstances the Conference could start practical consideration of the monitored cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes - under effective control, of course.

If we were to look for the most glaring example of the international community's impotence to solve the tasks it has set itself within a few decades, the problem of nuclear tests would be among the major candidates. The fact that the Conference has failed to take action in this regard undermines its authority. At the same time it is obvious that a test ban is not only a measure to curb the nuclear arms race but a very important means of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The time has truly come,

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

we believe, to establish an ad hoc committee on this issue, which could set to work, and the sooner the better. The Czechoslovak proposal for a mandate for this committee might provide a basis, and this has been recognized by all. Essentially, the discussion is about words. Maybe it would be better to stop this dispute and agree to accept the draft mandate as it is? It is a suggestion based on compromise, which emerged after long disputes and discussions. In this connection, I should like to reaffirm once again my delegation's support for the efforts being undertaken by the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki in this direction. We see no contradiction between the Conference's starting work on the testing issue, which will inevitably be of a step-by-step nature, and the step-by-step approach which the USSR and the United States agreed upon as a basis for negotiations on nuclear testing, although the stage-by-stage approach may of course take different concrete forms.

Protocols to the Soviet-American threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 have been signed, and this means that the first aim of the bilateral Soviet-American talks has been achieved. In accordance with the existing agreement, we support the continuation of these bilateral negotiations for the purpose of considering further limitations on the number and yield of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has suggested resuming them in September, and we expect a positive reply from the American side.

Literally a few words on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Space technology is one of the most rapidly developing fields. It is directly related to security and stability. We do not know exactly what kind of space technology we will have to deal with in 10 or 15 years' time, in particular that which may be of military significance, although we do know about the research being conducted in this field. To see that the Conference on Disarmament has been going round in circles on space issues for many years gives rise to gloomy thoughts. Like many other members of the Conference, the Soviet Union has introduced a number of proposals for radical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space - measures of a prohibitory nature aimed at preventing the development and deployment either of any space weapons at all, or of specific types of weapon, such as anti-satellite weapons. However, experience shows that such radical measures cannot become the subject of concrete negotiations in the near future. As a result, more and more delegations are opting to begin with confidence-building measures in space. We believe that this is right. The idea here is not to start negotiations just for the sake of negotiations, in order to be able to report that we are conducting negotiations on outer space, but rather to take the first steps towards establishing the basis for confidence with respect to States' space activities - if you will, to build up experience with constructive multilateral work as regards the outer space dimension of security and stability. However important the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations are, multilateral efforts are vital here, because an increasing number of States are becoming involved in space activities. Therefore, we suggest that the concept of "open outer space" should become a subject of consideration at the Conference on Disarmament. The most important measures related to the realization of the "open outer space" concept, in our view, include (a) the

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

strengthening of the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; (b) the elaboration of "rules of the road" or a "code of conduct"; (c) the use of space-based monitoring devices in the interest of the international community; and (d) the establishment of an international space inspectorate. France's proposal for the establishment of an international centre to process images obtained from space also deserves a positive response. These measures cannot endanger anybody's security, and we urge all States to study thoroughly the positive potential embodied in the "open outer space" concept.

In conclusion, a few words on chemical weapons. It is generally recognized that in present circumstances the most promising direction in the work of the Conference is the drawing up of a convention on this subject. Great importance is attached to the Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons in this regard. The USSR and the United States are to begin to implement its major provisions without waiting for the convention to be concluded. The obligation not to produce chemical weapons is of special importance, in our view, within the context of this bilateral agreement. Indeed, it is a corner-stone of the future multilateral convention. And the fact that the USSR and the United States have agreed to assume such an obligation without waiting for the convention to be completed is, in our view, convincing evidence of the readiness of the parties to the bilateral agreement to work for the early conclusion of the multilateral convention. For the USSR, this also means that its unilateral decision to stop production of chemical weapons (and this was done in 1987) will be formalized as an international treaty, thus settling unequivocally and irrevocably the question of whether Soviet society will devote new resources to the production of chemical weapons.

The bilateral agreement provides that, at the multilateral negotiations, the USSR and the United States will introduce a proposal to hold a special conference at the end of the eighth year after the convention enters into force, to decide by a majority vote whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for the final destruction of chemical weapons. The joint statement contains details of this proposal. In this connection, I would like, not just on behalf of my delegation, but also on behalf of the United States delegation, to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates to a working paper in the CD/CW/WP.... series, but I think without a number as yet - this is an advance copy which is before you. Both our delegations plan to dwell in greater detail thereon in due course and in the appropriate context, and this step has been undertaken in pursuance of the bilateral agreement signed on 1 June in Washington.

Now turning back to my own statement, I would like to stress that here we have a compromise proposal that takes into account both elements of the United States proposal known as the "2 per cent" proposal, and the criticism of that initial American proposal by the USSR and a number of other participants in the negotiations. Both the need to evaluate participation in the convention by States which are important from the point of view of its

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

effectiveness, and the importance of avoiding incentives to acquire chemical weapons, are taken into account. Moreover, this proposal stimulates States possessing chemical weapons to become original parties to the convention.

Finally, with all due respect to those who have criticized this proposal, I would like to say that I do not in any way share their perception of attempts to impose some sort of Soviet-American diktat, or a wish on the part of the two countries to force their decisions upon other participants in the negotiations. The bilateral agreement clearly states that the two sides have agreed to introduce the proposal - and I stress, the proposal - at the Conference on Disarmament. And this, of course, is the legitimate right of every participant in the negotiations. For our part, we are satisfied with this joint approach and we will champion its advantages in our future work. At the same time, we consider it essential to step up efforts to solve the problem of the universality of the future convention.

In this connection, I should like to return to the statement adopted by the NATO foreign ministers at Turnberry, and specifically the passage in which the members of the North Atlantic bloc state their intention to be among the first to sign the future convention. We welcome that declaration. Of course we also welcome the even more far-reaching statements made here by Sweden and Finland concerning their readiness to become original participants. We have great hopes that during the summer session of the Conference, the multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons will acquire new dynamism, which, unfortunately, they have sometimes been lacking in recent times. Strictly speaking, not much remains to be done, and it is important to lay a solid foundation within the remaining time to solve all outstanding issues, first and foremost those concerning definitions and challenge inspections, ad hoc inspections, assistance to victims of CW use, etc.

In its statement today, the Soviet delegation has shared its views with you on a number of key aspects of the problem of disarmament and the role the Conference on Disarmament could play in finding solutions. I think that one of the significant phenomena of our work today is the fact that this Conference is turning its eyes on itself. We have begun to look collectively for our place in a rapidly changing world. We plan to dwell on this subject and some other issues pertaining to the work of the Conference in the near future.

MR BAYART (Mongolia): first of all, Mr President, I wish to congratulate you on the effective and skilful manner in which you have conducted the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the month of June. I also wish to thank Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, of Pakistan, for his excellent work as President of the Conference in April. This is the last opportunity for me to address the Conference on Disarmament before relinquishing my post as the head of the Mongolian delegation. Allow me to say a few words of a somewhat personal nature.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

During the years of my service here in Geneva, historic changes have taken place in international relations. A model of international security is being forged through collective efforts. Democratization of international relations is taking shape. These changes are profound in nature and open new, brighter horizons for disarmament negotiations. Important landmark agreements have been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. The verification issue, which has long been the stumbling-block on the road to disarmament, proved to be solvable, given political will, a spirit of compromise and co-operation.

I hope that the latest agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons will serve as a catalyst in our common endeavour to achieve the early conclusion of a global convention. I also believe that the future convention on the banning of chemical weapons is a unique one with its innovative approach to a number of traditionally extremely difficult problems. I am confident that the carefully crafted procedures on verification and implementation will serve as a model for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

It is a pleasure for me to announce that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has decided to withdraw the reservation it made on the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. In our view such a step constitutes an important measure to strengthen the prohibition régime envisaged in the Protocol.

The Mongolian Government welcomes the joint statement of the USSR and the United States concerning the treaty on strategic offensive arms. The START treaty, which is expected to be ready for signing by the end of the year, should become an important milestone in the disarmament negotiations of recent years. By cutting the strategic offensive arms of the two Powers almost in half, this treaty would make an important contribution to international peace and enhance stability.

I am returning to my country at a time of sweeping changes. The process of restructuring and renovation in Mongolia has accelerated. Undoubtedly political developments during the first half of this year will have a profound impact on the future of my country. The main goal of the radical changes that Mongolia is undergoing is, in short, the attainment of genuine democracy. The Government is directing the thrust of its policy to the human and social dimensions of development. The restructuring embraces all spheres of the country's social and political life, including its foreign policy. The Mongolian Government has consistently pursued the policy of developing and strengthening its relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence, mutually beneficial co-operation and respect for the right of peoples to choose their own path of development, and it remains faithful to those principles. The Government of Mongolia has adopted non-alignment as one of the basic principles of its foreign policy. My Government will continue to

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

pursue its policy of keeping Mongolia free of nuclear weapons; it will not station on the territory of Mongolia foreign troops or armed forces directed against a third country; it continues to promote and strengthen mutual confidence with neighbouring and all other countries. On the basis of these principles Mongolia will seek to guarantee its security by political means. My country will continue its active participation in the work of the United Nations and other international organizations, and will promote the solution of global problems such as disarmament, environmental protection, the establishment of a new economic order, etc.

I have been in Geneva for more than five years. For me personally they have been fascinating and highly rewarding. I shall always cherish the fond memories of my personal friendships, official contacts and co-operation with my colleagues. I have tried my best to benefit and learn from them. I have always admired and respected my colleagues' deep knowledge of disarmament problems and diplomatic skill in conducting negotiations. In my diplomatic career I have been associated with the Conference on Disarmament for more than 10 years. I share the view that the Conference on Disarmament has inherited too much from the past, such as its agenda, its decision-making process and the organization of its work. It is evident that the Conference on Disarmament should take steps to adjust itself to the present reality. This is a process that will require serious negotiations and can be realized gradually. I firmly believe in the Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and I am sure that the collective efforts and political wisdom of its members will find the right solution to the important question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD. And, in the light of the improved international climate, I have every reason to be optimistic and expect that the time will come soon when constructive and productive negotiations will commence on a number of priority issues, in particular the comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, I wish to thank most sincerely Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Ambassador Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, for the unfailing support and co-operation they have given me during my assignment here, especially at the time when I had the honour to serve the CD as its President in July of last year, and when I chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1986 and 1989. I also wish to thank the able and efficient staff of the disarmament secretariat and all those whom we do not see in this Council chamber but whose dedication and high professional performance keep the CD running so smoothly. With sadness in my heart I say goodbye to you all. I wish you and the Conference on Disarmament every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia for his statement, as well as for the kind words he addressed to me. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf I wish to convey to Ambassador and Mrs. Bayart our best wishes for personal happiness and professional success in their country. Ambassador Bayart, as we are all

(The President)

aware, has represented his country effectively, skilfully and honourably, not to mention his well-known gifts as a linguist. During his activities in this Conference he made an outstanding contribution to our work as President, and on two occasions he also chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. On both occasions Ambassador Bayart, who is leaving us as deputy dean of the representatives in the Conference, served with his usual skill. We wish you every personal good fortune, Ambassador Bayart.

I have no other speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I would suggest that we take up our timetable of meetings for next week. The secretariat circulated this timetable today. As usual, it was prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As you will see from the text, open-ended consultations on the question of the improved and more effective functioning of the Conference will take place on Tuesday 3 July instead of Thursday 5 July. That date has been given to the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 5. As always, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. If there are no objections, may I take it that the Conference adopts the timetable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I would like now to turn to the closing date for the 1990 session of the Conference. I wish to inform you that as a result of the consultations which have taken place over the past few days, there seems to be agreement on concluding our work on Friday 24 August. This is on the clear understanding that the plenary meeting that is scheduled for Thursday 23 August will be put off to the next day at 4.30 p.m. May I take it that there are no objections to the date proposed?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I would now like to make my closing statement as President from Peru for the month of June 1990.

As this is the last plenary meeting at which I will serve as President on behalf of Peru, I wish to share with you some thoughts in my capacity as outgoing President. First of all, I should note that the work of the second part of the 1990 session began in good time in keeping with the tradition of the Conference on Disarmament, and that includes the activities of subsidiary bodies. The programme of work for the second half of the session was adopted and, after successful consultations, we reached the hoped-for consensus on the date for the closing of the 1990 session - that is, we will conclude our work on 24 August next. We have had six plenary meetings including this one. In the six meetings we have had less than 10 speakers, and I must confess that sometimes I felt somewhat lonely in plenary. But at all events I am pleased that I managed to keep the Conference going in an exceptionally competitive atmosphere in Geneva, a period rich in attractions such as the visit to Munster and the meetings on non-proliferation, including the one organized by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan on behalf of the Bellerive group, which had great drawing power.

(The President)

During these 17 days in which I served as President, I had a particularly close view of Ambassador Donowaki's efforts to finalize the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. While I have taken an impartial position as President, and that will always be the case, I cannot remain neutral in the face of the delay in establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban in this Conference. The setting up of such a committee is indispensable, and this must take place in the immediate future if there is to be symmetry in the work of this Conference. By that I mean that the intensive work that has been done in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons must also be balanced by similar efforts in dealing with the nuclear issues, particularly the question of the nuclear test ban, and also within an ad hoc committee. I am sure that the establishment of such an ad hoc committee will in the future strengthen the legitimacy of the Conference on Disarmament in promoting discussions on the nuclear test ban at a time when we are witnessing new and positive trends in nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms control, and, above all - I wish to stress this point - it would in the future prevent bitter discussions at the forthcoming conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Inflexibility in respect of setting up an ad hoc committee on item 1 would, I sincerely believe, create an unnecessary atmosphere of confrontation within the positive climate that now exists for the holding of the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I hope that common sense and a spirit of compromise will finally prevail, and that in the first week or two of July my successor Ambassador Sujka of Poland will be able to announce the setting up of the ad hoc committee which has been called for on so many occasions.

On Items 2 and 3 of our agenda, informal plenary meetings have been resumed to discuss elements of substance relating to two issues of the greatest interest. In this respect we would express a wish that, as requested by the Group of 21 in the first half of this year, the START negotiators will in the near future participate in these informal meetings so as to inform this Conference, off the record, of details of the START negotiations after the Washington summit.

On 14 and 15 June, at the kind invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, almost all the representatives accredited to the Conference on Disarmament visited the training and research centre at Munster, enabling us to acquaint ourselves on the spot with the various aspects and stages of the process of detection and destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the practical application of some verification methods. On behalf of my delegation and the Conference I wish to request Ambassador von Wagner to convey to his Government our gratitude for its kind hospitality and the excellent organization of that most useful visit.

As you know, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has also resumed its work under the capable guidance of Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. With respect to this item I should mention in particular the meeting

(The President)

taking place currently with representatives of the chemical industry which is due to end tomorrow and which, I think, will be very useful in ascertaining the views of the private sector on the various aspects of the draft convention, for example the question of confidentiality.

Another subject which should be highlighted in these first few weeks of this second part of the 1990 session concerns the beginning of informal consultations on the question of the improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of my good friend and colleague, Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan. This is a major first step, the outcome of the clearly expressed wish and determination of all the members of this Conference, and it should therefore be followed by other steps to finalize gradually the agreements reached starting in 1991.

I think it is a positive sign of convergence that the programme of consultations submitted by Ambassador Kamal for our consideration has been accepted without objections. Thus in the first working session there was extensive analysis and exchange of ideas on various positions concerning expansion of the membership of the Conference. Interesting initiatives emerged which could serve as a basis for exploring new models or formulae that would lead us to a solution allowing for expansion, as all wish.

Last but not least, I am pleased to transfer the presidency of this Conference to the experienced hands of Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, who will be succeeding me. I wish him every success as he carries out his duties. I wish to thank the secretariat for its important and ongoing work in support of the President. In particular I wish to express my appreciation to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and to Ambassador Berasategui.

I see there is no other business, and I shall therefore proceed to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday 3 July at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.561
3 July 1990

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-61897/2092B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 561st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and myself, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Markus Meckel, who will address this plenary meeting. In addition to his important responsibilities, the Minister is a political figure engaged in the search for an effective framework which would ensure security for all in Europe. His role is crucial to the success of the endeavours to achieve that objective. This development will have considerable influence on the work of our Conference, in which the delegation of the German Democratic Republic has actively participated. I am sure that the statement of the Minister will be followed by all members with special interest.

Allow me now, at the beginning of the presidency of Poland for the month of July, to read a message addressed to the Conference by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski:

"The Republic of Poland has the honour to assume this month the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Towards the end of the six-year period that has elapsed since Poland last held this responsible function, profound changes have taken place in the life of Poland and its people, as well as in the life of the international community. We have entered a new stage in international relations.

The improvement of the international atmosphere is bearing fruit in various parts of the world. Hotbeds of wars and many regional conflicts are being extinguished. The United Nations mechanisms, including the prerogatives of the Secretary-General, are being utilized to an increasing extent. States are striving to base international relations on mutual respect for their rights and responsibilities and on the strict observance of the principles of morality and international law. A conviction that military power can no longer be viewed as a basis for maintaining peace and international security is paving its way in the interdependent world of today.

It is, though, the European continent where these transformations abound as a result of positive developments in Eastern and Central Europe. My country played a leading role in inspiring those developments. Confrontation and rivalry are giving way nowadays to co-operation and partnership. Divisions are disappearing, and the unity of the continent is becoming a realistic vision.

Changes in the international situation have had significant impact on progress in the disarmament process. The disarmament dialogue between the United States and the USSR has already resulted in the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate - and Shorter-Range Missiles and, for the first time, makes the reduction of the strategic potentials of both countries a realistic prospect. The dialogue has also been conducive to achieving progress in other areas such as chemical weapons. The recently-concluded agreement on the destruction and non-production of these weapons is of vital importance for the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Intensive negotiations are also under way in Europe on the

reduction of conventional armed forces and on the next generation of confidence-building measures. Efforts are being made to secure greater openness on military activity, an example of which is the discussion on military doctrines and the negotiations on the "open skies" régime.

Disarmament continues to be one of the greatest challenges confronting the world. It is an important element of any stable system of international security. The Conference on Disarmament, the only universal forum for disarmament negotiations, has an important role to play in this regard. That is why we welcome efforts aimed at increasing its efficiency so as to keep pace with other, bilateral or regional, negotiations.

The advanced state of negotiations on the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and a favourable political climate amplified by the recent actions of the two major possessors of these weapons permit me to conclude that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of finalizing its work on the convention in the very near future.

Poland actively participates in the efforts towards this goal. The Polish Government reaffirms its readiness to be among the original signatories of the convention. Poland also wishes to declare its willingness to abide by the provisions of the convention prior to its entry into force. My country neither produces nor stockpiles chemical weapons. It has no intention of doing so. We are prepared to accept - on the basis of reciprocity - verification of declared data with respect to all Polish military facilities, as well as the chemical industry and business activities within the scope of the convention.

Poland also attaches importance to other items on the agenda of the Conference, including the questions of a nuclear weapons test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I wish to convey my best wishes to all the delegates and to express the hope that our patient search for solutions and the building of wide platforms of understanding will be conducive to reaching specific results in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Poland".

That concludes the message of His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

As President of the Conference, I wish to extend to Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru our appreciation of the skilful and effective manner in which he discharged his responsibilities as my predecessor. Ambassador de Rivero will soon assume another important task, that of President of the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I wish him every success and am sure that his competence and experience will be of considerable value for the participants in that Conference.

Allow me now to make some brief comments on those matters relating to organizational arrangements which are before the Conference. I have in mind in the first place the important question of agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". Ambassador Donowaki of Japan has actively continued his consultations on that subject and, thanks to his able and untiring efforts, there is a widespread feeling that we are not far from agreement. At the same time, an element of urgency is becoming more evident. I do hope that, with the co-operation of all of us, Ambassador Donowaki will succeed in his endeavours. Of course, I am available to support him whenever he would consider it appropriate.

Another subject being addressed by the Conference deals with its improved and effective functioning. Under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, the informal open-ended consultations are providing a useful framework for the consideration of a number of subjects which may streamline and update our organizational practices in the light of the new political developments in the international system. The frank and co-operative exchange of views held in those consultations is promising. We should take advantage of this positive atmosphere to agree on practical measures which will facilitate our work on substantive issues.

Lastly, may I note that I remain at the disposal of delegations on any matter which might be brought to the attention of the Chair.

We shall now proceed with the order of business for today.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I wish to recall that, in accordance with the timetable for this week, the Conference will hold today an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers today the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Markus Meckel, to whom I take pleasure in giving the floor.

Mr. MECKEL (German Democratic Republic) (translated from German): Mr. President, I want to thank you for the warm words of welcome which you addressed to my country and to me personally. I am very happy to be among the first to congratulate you, the representative of Poland, on assuming the presidency of this important forum. The people of Poland have to their credit a decisive share in the democratic transformations in Eastern and Central Europe. They sent out an important signal by rising up against the dictatorship.

The relations between Germany and Poland were for centuries marked by hate, enmity and wars. The Germans participated several times in the division of Poland and inflicted serious damage on it. You may rest assured that we have drawn the lessons from this sorrowful history. Poland's interests will be taken into account in the process of German unification. This was among the reasons for my first visit abroad, which took me to Warsaw.

I wish you much success, Mr. President, in coping with the considerable responsibilities that lie ahead of you in the crucial month of the summer session.

Mr. President, esteemed delegates, the first freely-elected Government of the German Democratic Republic expressed its commitment to disarmament right from the outset. It seeks to advance the disarmament process in the course of unification and will continue to do so following unification. This Government has its origins in the revolution of autumn 1989, in which the movement for human rights and peace played an outstanding role. I shall endeavour to incorporate the human values and political objectives of this movement into the new political system of our country and to contribute them to a united Germany soon.

It is a comprehensive understanding of security which lies at the basis of the policies of the Government of the German Democratic Republic in the international arena. Our concerns include not only military questions but also disarmament and human rights, environmental protection and the social and economic development of all.

Geneva is symbolic in this respect for the people of our country, too. Located in the heart of Europe, it was for centuries a place of tolerance, offering a sanctuary to those persecuted on religious and political grounds. The city's great son, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, made a lasting impact on mankind's stock of democratic ideas with his Social Contract. Great hopes have been pinned on the Geneva-based United Nations agencies responsible for human rights and social and economic issues, and on the disarmament talks in progress here. This conference plays a major role as what is still the only multilateral negotiating forum devoted to global disarmament, but Geneva at the same time is the place where the World Council of Churches and the International Red Cross have their headquarters and from where important impulses go out into the world.

The revolutionary events of autumn 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe did not only put an end to ossified social and political structures. They also opened up new opportunities for disarmament by overcoming the ideological division of Europe and putting an end to the cold war. The German Democratic Republic intends to play its full part both by assuming unilateral commitments and by taking an active part in the talks in Vienna and here in Geneva. In the period that remains up to the establishment of the unity of Germany, the Government of the German Democratic Republic will be pressing for tangible and verifiable steps designed to usher in a qualitatively new stage in European disarmament politics.

The cessation of weapons' manufacture and reductions in the strength of the armed forces bring considerable social and economic problems in their wake for the German Democratic Republic. In order to alleviate them, conversion programmes have been elaborated and work is being continued thereon. A conversion office is being set up to co-ordinate the relevant economic and social processes. An institute responsible for the conversion of the armed forces was set up only recently to deal with the broader conditions for conversion in security policy and economic terms, and also personnel questions, military hardware, ecology and verification.

We are ready to co-operate with you and to take up existing experience in this area. We are looking forward with great expectations to the conversion conference which the United Nations and the Soviet Union will organize in Moscow in August.

Transparency and openness in military affairs and parliamentary control are becoming integral elements of our day-to-day political practice. This year, the German Democratic Republic has for the first time participated in the United Nations standardized report system on military expenditures and laid open its budget data for 1989.

The interest which German unification has aroused worldwide is understandable. German unification is not only a matter for Germans but at the same time a matter concerning Europe as a whole. However, nobody should be afraid of it. What we are aiming at is a united Germany that will never again be able nor seek to become a centre of military power; we want a Germany that constitutes a factor of peace and stability.

We favour a drastic cut in all German armed forces. The two German States should, in our view, declare their preparedness to reduce markedly German armed forces. The ceiling for the armed forces of a united Germany could be some 300,000 men to begin with. This would mean halving the present combined troop strength of the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic should propose to tne States participating in the Vienna CFE talks the inclusion of this ceiling in the negotiations under way. We are convinced that such an initiative, which should be endorsed by the two German States and also by NATO countries as well as the other States involved therein, would substantially facilitate further work.

The German Democratic Republic has renounced the production, proliferation and possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and would like to see an article to the same effect included in the constitution of a unified Germany. Chemical weapons as well as all nuclear weapons have to be withdrawn from German soil. It is our objective that a future Germany should resolutely stand up for disarmament in Europe and the world at large. Part of the arms spending by the two German States could be used to fund an all-German development policy. Over and above this, I support the proposal made by Willy Brandt and the Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker to make available one third of the resources saved in the future through armament cuts for economic growth in developing countries.

The legitimate security interests of our neighbours will be taken into account in the process of German unification. This refers particularly to the frontier question. Territorial claims and disputes about frontiers led to wars all too frequently in the past. Our attitude on the frontiers of a future Germany is clear: they will coincide with the current external frontiers of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. A united Germany will have no territorial claims against other States. That has recently been declared by the Parliaments and notified to Poland by the Governments of both the German States.

The process of German unification is part and parcel of the pan-European unification process. The key in both cases is disarmament and the creation of new security structures in the framework of the CSCE.

Rapid agreement at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments would be an important step in this direction. Given the political will, an initial accord can be reached by autumn. Closely associated with this, a mandate could be given for the talks to be continued with a view to achieving drastic force reductions and restructuring armed forces so as to limit them to purely defensive capabilities. What we are seeking is a pan-European security system with ever fewer military functions.

It is a crucial link in the chain to sort out the external aspects of German unification. Sensible solutions considering the interest of all sides will advance like a catalyst the creation of a pan-European order marked by peace, by democracy and by co-operation. No side must be put at a disadvantage in this process. It is in the interests of Germany, Europe and the world at large that Germany be firmly integrated in a future pan-European security system.

Such a security system can be built on what already exists. What might be used in the first stage, apart from the CSCE process, are existing institutions like the Council of Europe and the European economic organizations, the European Communities and NATO.

NATO in particular, must discard the ballast of the post-war period. It is in this spirit that the German Democratic Republic is contributing to a fundamental change in the character, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, as decided at the recent meeting of its Political Consultative Committee. The Warsaw Treaty Organization will only be in a position to meet the tasks facing it in connection with disarmament and the transition to a pan-European security system if it takes on a political function of identifying common interests. Another element of this transition is the reduction of launchers, nuclear-capable artillery and nuclear warheads by the end of the year, as announced in Copenhagen recently by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

But NATO, too, must change, clearly abandoning military functions in favour of political ones. Nuclear first use, forward defence and follow-on forces attack strategies and new long-range nuclear stand-off weapons have no place in the new Europe, which has left behind the policy of deterrence and the cold war. The first practical steps in this direction are encouraging. The decision by United States President George Bush against a successor system to the Lance and the modernization of nuclear artillery shells is to be welcomed.

We are looking forward with high hopes to the results of the NATO summit next month. The transformation of the military alliances is indispensable if the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace in Europe coupled with suitable security guarantees is to begin now. As early as 1967, NATO, in adopting the Harmel Report, set itself the objective of achieving a just and lasting order of peace in Europe that would include suitable security guarantees. Major conditions now exist for attaining this goal. The historic moment, in our view, calls for a political signal of similar importance, a signal that will add to the vision of 1967 concrete ideas and proposals on ways of putting it into practice, so that the way is cleared for gradually overcoming the situation whereby the CSCE States deter each other.

We believe that the security alliance to which Germany is to belong in the future must have a primarily political character expressed in unambiguous terms. Its foremost task ought to be the prevention of war through the organization of disarmament on our continent and through the establishment of a pan-European security structure.

I can imagine that a united Germany belonging to such a changed NATO in a co-operative security system as a successor to the German Democratic Republic will take part in a consultative mechanism together with the Warsaw Treaty States provided that it has developed such a political function. This would pose no problems if both alliances no longer confronted each other as enemies but were gradually proceeding to new forms of co-operation in security policies. This would even hold true if the Warsaw Treaty would collapse.

New approaches are required in efforts to achieve the security system we aspire to.

One idea would be the conclusion, in the CSCE framework, of a security treaty providing for the creation of a pan-European security union. Such a treaty could build on the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Helsinki Final Act, imposing on the parties the obligation to keep the peace among themselves and towards others, and to assist each other in case of treaty violations. The parties could also commit themselves to abide by procedures for the settlement of disputes, to observe transparency and verification methods in the military field, and to give a defensive character to their national security concepts and structures.

Such a step would be in line with the best traditions of European humanitarian thought. Almost 200 years ago already, Immanuel Kant, in his treatise Perpetual Peace, voiced the hope that it would be possible to develop human reason in such measure that it would plainly rule out war as a legitimate course of action while making peace an absolute duty, which "cannot be effected or guaranteed without a compact among nations".

Kant, at that time, advocated a "pacific alliance". We are faced with the need today to institutionalize the CSCE process, especially in the field of security policy. There are a good many ideas on how to do this. Only recently the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the German Democratic Republic submitted a relevant joint proposal to the other CSCE participating States. Experience gathered on other continents should also be taken into account. I am thinking, for instance, of the OAS and the OAU.

A consensus is emerging in favour of a CSCE foreign ministers' council with a permanent secretariat, a verification agency, and a body for crisis management and the settlement of disputes.

The beginnings of such bodies are already developing. A verification agency, for example, could build on the inspections envisaged in the Stockholm Document, on the verification system that will emerge from the Vienna talks and on the air surveillance system being sought at the Open Skies Conference. Other proposals that could be taken up concern verificaion by satellite and a communications system linking the CSCE capitals.

Moreover, practical requirements of the disarmament process might make it advisable to create a European agency for arms conversion.

A summit meeting of the CSCE States later this year should give concrete shape to the progress on the road to a European security system and provide an impetus for its further shaping. Far-reaching decisions could then be taken at another summit in 1992.

For us, Europe is not an end in itself. The ending of the East-West conflict and the positive developments on this continent should also lend momentum to security, disarmament and co-operation on a global scale.

It is also clear, however, that a favourable course of development and lasting peace in Europe are possible only if progress is made on the global issues facing mankind as a whole.

For the first time in European post-war history there is a chance today of creating within the CSCE framework a regional security system along the lines of article 52 of the United Nations Charter. This will promote the effective implementation of the global security system on the basis of the Charter.

The disarmament and confidence-building measures expected to be forthcoming in Europe in the near future will create favourable conditions for disarmament efforts in other regions and the world as a whole. New possibilities are opening up on a broader front for closing the North-South gap, for establishing a more just world economic order, for reducing military arsenals and arms exports.

The implementation of the INF Treaty is entering its final stage. It will have to be followed by further steps towards nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of a START treaty is expected before the end of this year. Further substantial reductions have been announced in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals.

Talks are in sight on tactical nuclear weapons. It is becoming time for the other nuclear-weapon Powers to get involved in the process of nuclear disarmament. A halt to the manufacture of nuclear weapons is another point which should be put on the agenda.

There is a considerable wealth of experience to rely on with regard to all the steps mentioned above. The verification procedures developed in Soviet-American agreements and talks in the past, the co-operative testing of verification methods and techniques commenced by both sides and the safeguards system for nuclear materials used by the International Atomic Energy Agency for decades are of invaluable significance to the continuation of the nuclear disarmament process.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament could help advance this process by discussing conceptional issues with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. This being so, I should like to encourage you to carry on with the informal talks on this issue started at the spring session.

The Conference on Disarmament should also help prevent an arms race in outer space. Confidence-building measures in outer space adopted on a multilateral basis would constitute an effective supplement to Soviet-American talks.

A total nuclear test ban continues to be of the utmost relevance to nuclear disarmament. The recent agreements reached between the USSR and the USA with a view to putting into effect their treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are important and should soon be followed by further agreements on the reduction of the number and yield of such tests.

We are also in favour of preparing the ground in a multilateral framework for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is what pressure groups all over the world expect your Conference to do.

The international seismic data exchange system for global test-ban monitoring developed by the Group of Scientific Experts has provided an important foundation for more substantial political advances. This has led to the German Democratic Republic taking part in the international experiments for the exchange of complete seismic registrations. Now the time has come for the Conference to start a comprehensive discussion about all issues involved in a test ban.

We consider the convening for early next year of an Amendment Conference to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which was signed in Moscow in 1963, to be an expression of the world-wide interest in a speedy termination of nuclear test explosions. This conference must lend momentum to the relevant activities on all levels.

Progress in this direction would also go a long way towards strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose Fourth Review Conference will soon start its work in Geneva. It is the first time that such a gathering will be held against a background of nuclear disarmament. I regard this as an omen of success. It should set the course for an extension of this essential treaty in five years' time.

In many United Nations resolutions and declarations the international community has come out in favour of complementary disarmament talks at the bilateral, regional and global levels. However, a glaring contrast has become apparent of late between rapid progress in Soviet-American and European talks, on the one hand, and a failure to make sufficient use of global bodies, on the other.

The prohibition of chemical weapons, which is an issue of the utmost priority, especially here at this Conference, constitutes the only exception so far.

By speedily finalizing a convention, your Conference would make a substantial contribution to the process of disarmament, lending it a global dimension. A universal ban on these weapons of mass destruction would constitute the best foundation for harnessing chemistry, free from distrust, to the advantage of all States and peoples.

Much has been accomplished in recent years. The agreement signed in Washington to reduce the CW arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States is generating fresh momentum. The agreed termination of the manufacture of chemical weapons is a landmark decision that may become the starting point for practical action to finalize the convention shortly.

I would like to submit the following suggestions for consideration:

First, could not the other States owning chemical weapons also cease to manufacture these weapons of mass destruction and provide information about their stockpiles?

Second, could not all other States renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons and declare that? Even before the convention takes effect the non-proliferation of chemical weapons must become a well-established law of international life;

Third, could not the participants in the Disarmament Conference seize the unique opportunity of the international climate to intensify their work for the banning of all chemical weapons?

And finally, should not every effort be made even today to make the convention a truly universal agreement after its completion?

The treaty will truly be effective if it bans chemical weapons outright, thus enhancing the security of all parties and of the world at large.

As we see it, the purpose of a reliable system of verification would be to ensure compliance with the treaty and to build confidence.

It must be effective as well as cost-effective and realistic. For this reason we support efforts to improve the monitoring of civilian chemical industry through ad hoc inspections so that the international community may be certain that no chemical weapons are being produced.

Inspections on challenge that may take place at any time and at any place remain a last resort for settling problems relating to compliance with treaty provisions. Given the sensitive nature of this issue, it will be necessary to find prudent and well-balanced solutions. The proposal put forward in April by the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee marks such an approach to this key political question.

Negotiations should, at any rate, focus on the still open key issues, notably in the domain of verification. They must not get bogged down in technical details of secondary importance, which can be resolved even after the conclusion of the convention.

Surely, it would be appropriate now to conduct the negotiations without any major interruptions to the point where the convention can be concluded. The Committee Chairman should receive the necessary mandate.

What counts in the period ahead is the will to succeed. On balance, it would seem that the time has come: to reach a fundamental understanding on those basic obligations under the convention which have been more or less finalized; to map out the road for the solution of questions that remain open;

to fix a time-scale for the final stages of the work. The forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly could be the proper forum for reaching such an agreement. I believe that the objective of banning a whole class of weapons of mass destruction justifies the effort.

The increased number of participants, attributable to the presence of new observers this year, will make for a wider representation of interests and for greater international acceptance of the convention. Simultaneously, the dialogue on accession should be conducted within a regional framework. We are in touch with member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and of NATO. Australia has set a good example with the initiative it has taken. The commitment of the general public - I am thinking of the recent seminar on chemical weapons of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in the Middle East - also deserves our respect.

It is beyond any doubt that the two German States or a united Germany will sign the convention as soon as it has been finalized. This is, among other things, our debt to history. It was German troops who were the first to employ chemical weapons at Ypres in 1915.

I would like to assure you that the German Democratic Republic will continue to play an active part in the negotiations as long as it exists and will take its commitment into a united Germany. We will give others the benefit of our experience from trial inspections and from the development of verification technology, and we are prepared to take further confidence-building measures. Let me tell you that my delegation chairing a working group will do its utmost to promote the solution of such important aspects of the convention as sanctions and the resolution of disputes.

Together with the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic will make arrangements for the implementation of the projected convention in a united Germany.

In the shape of the Biological Weapons Convention, an agreement to ban an entire class of mass destruction weapons has been in force for 15 years. If the convention were strengthened by verification measures, this would surely have a major effect in terms of confidence-building. This is what we expect the next Review Conference to do. Scientists in my country want to contribute to this goal by arranging an international colloquium on the prevention of a biological and toxin arms race, due to be held at Kühlungsborn, German Democratic Republic, in September this year.

At this time of momentous political changes, the Disarmament Conference is faced with growing demands. Alongside bilateral and regional mechanisms, it assumes an irreplaceable role with respect to multilateral negotiations. So your responsibilities are very great indeed. May the work that lies ahead of you be crowned with success.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to me.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

I wish to inform the Conference that Ambassador Ledogar of the United States and Minister Batsanov of the Soviet Union have jointly offered the participation of their strategic arms negotiators, Ambassador Richard Burt and Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, in the informal CD meeting next Tuesday, 10 July. Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin would plan to make informal remarks on various issues in the strategic arms negotiations, after which there will be a question and answer period. I am sure that the members of the Conference welcome this offer and will be very happy to listen to the remarks of both negotiators, as well as to hold a question and answer period on the strategic arms negotiations. I am looking forward to the participation of Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin at our informal meeting on 10 July.

As I noted at the opening of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold, immediately afterwards, an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2.

I recognize the distinguished representative of Austria.

Mr. KEMPEL (Austria): Mr. President, concerning your remarks on the invitation of Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin, you said that it will be an informal plenary. I just wanted to express the interest of my delegation in participating and inquire whether it is also possible for other observer delegations to be present.

The PRESIDENT: It has just been explained to me by the Secretary-General and his deputy that those delegations which have applied for participation in informal sessions of the Conference are very welcome.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.562
5 July 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Boqumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-61916/6850A

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 562nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Norway and Finland.

I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Vaernø.

Mr. VAERNØ (Norway): Mr. President, first of all let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference for the month of July. We are certainly confident that your diplomatic skill and experience will guarantee efficient leadership of our negotiations during this month.

I have asked for the floor today in order to present two working papers. The first paper deals with verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and is based on research carried out by the Division for Environmental Toxicology at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, while the other paper summarizes the results of an international symposium on seismological aspects of nuclear test ban verification, which was held in Norway earlier this year.

The first working paper (CD/1008-CD/CW/WP.298), on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, gives a summary of this year's research report. It represents a continuation of the work being carried out at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment on this subject since 1981 and reported to the Conference on Disarmament in annual reports. During the current year, the Defence Research Establishment conducted an investigation to optimize the sample preparation method referred to as sorbent extraction. The aim of the investigation was to find a general procedure which can be used for screening samples suspected of being contaminated with chemical warfare agents.

The sorbent extraction technique is based on the principle of absorption of chemical compounds from an aqueous solution passed through a cartridge containing a polymer sorbent. With this technique the chemical agents are retained on the sorbent. This procedure has the advantages of not requiring advanced laboratory equipment and of being executable in the field close to a contaminated area. The sample is concentrated on a cartridge, thus reducing the quantity of material which has to be transported back to the laboratory and also making it easy to handle.

There are several factors which may affect the efficiency of sorbent extraction used in verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. In this report different non-polar sorbents have been tested to find which is most efficient in retaining the chemical warfare agents tabun, sarin, soman, VX, mustard gas and some related phosphorous compounds from aqueous solutions.

(Mr. Vareng, Norway)

Both the amount of sorbent and the sample volume have been examined to find the optimal combination. Another factor which I would like to stress in particular is the temperature conditions for the samples, both during storage and transport. This has been studied to find the requirements needed to prevent degradation of the chemical warfare agents and thereby increase the possibility for a reliable verification.

The second working paper I have the honour to introduce today gives a summary of the results of the International Workshop on Seismological Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Verification which was held in Norway in February of this year. A total of 76 scientists and representatives from 21 countries participated in the Workshop. The working paper is contained in document CD/1010.

The main theme of the Workshop was the role of regional seismic arrays in a test ban monitoring context. The participants were given an introduction to the two arrays of this type installed in Norway, NORESS and ARCESS, and they also attended a demonstration of the associated computer processing and data analysis facilities.

During a three-day scientific symposium, a total of 30 research papers were presented, addressing many of the outstanding problems and the state-of-the-art in seismic monitoring. In particular, several presentations focused on results using NORESS and ARCESS data, and the excellent capabilities of these arrays were clearly documented. A summary of the contributions is annexed to the working paper, and complete proceedings will be distributed to participants in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) later this year.

At the time the Workshop took place, GSE was in the process of conducting its first preparatory data exchanges for its ongoing technical test, GSETT-2. We are encouraged by the results achieved so far during this test, as reported in the progress report from the twenty-ninth session of the GSE. We hope that at its forthcoming thirtieth session GSE will be able to report on further progress in this important undertaking.

Norway is participating in GSETT-2 by contributing seismic data from both the NORESS and ARCESS regional arrays. In this connection I would like to recall Norway's earlier proposal to the Conference on Disarmament contained in document CD/714, that the NORESS/ARCESS array concept could serve as standard for seismic stations within the global network as envisaged by GSE. We are confident that the results from GSETT-2 will confirm the important contributions that arrays of this type can make within such a future global network.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Mrs. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest Blue Book, which has been circulated and will be issued as a CD document (CD/1009). Rather than being a totally Finnish contribution to the Conference on Disarmament, the 1990 Blue Book presents a detailed description of the results of an interlaboratory comparison (round-robin) test of which a working paper (CD/CW/WP.288) has already been circulated jointly by Australia, Canada, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

The aim of the exercise was to test existing procedures for sample preparation and analysis and to determine whether standard operating procedures would be required for the future Convention. It was not the intention of the exercise to choose laboratories for verification purposes as this will be the task of the Preparatory Commission.

Each laboratory received similar air and soil samples. The laboratories were free to choose their own methods for sample preparation and analysis, on the condition that all methods and instruments should be described in detail. The main objective was to identify agents and their degradation products qualitatively. After all laboratories had reported their findings the laboratory which had prepared the samples provided details of sample preparation, spiking chemicals and their concentrations in the samples. The experimental details of the test were discussed by the analysts in a meeting at the end of March. Before publication the draft of the Blue Book was sent to the participating laboratories for review.

All participating laboratories considered the round-robin test very useful. The samples were planned in such a way that the capability and skill of the laboratories would be demonstrated. The test showed the importance of proper handling of the samples during transport and in the laboratory before the samples are prepared for analysis. Sample-preparation is the most important step in the whole analytical procedure. Mistakes during sample-preparation cannot be corrected later on and thus they could jeopardize the final results. The exercise also clearly demonstrated the potential of the present analytical methods. It showed the value of chromatographic methods for screening purposes and the feasibility of obtaining unambiguous identification of chemical warfare agents in environmental samples by two independent spectrometric methods.

In the present report the term "Standard Operating Procedure" has been revised to "Recommended Operating Procedure" in order not to discourage laboratories from developing new and better methods.

Chapters 2 to 5 of the report comprise descriptions of the procedures used by the laboratories and relevant conclusions from the test are drawn in chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents the Recommended Operating Procedures as discussed by the analysts. However, as the time was too short to allow agreement of details of the procedures, some of them may reflect the views of the Finnish laboratory only and we acknowledge full responsibility for that. These procedures should be regarded as a basis for further discussions following the second round-robin test and not as the ultimate recommended procedures.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The Finnish CW-Project has drawn from this experiment the conclusion that continuous method development for sampling, sample-preparation, and analysis during the forthcoming years of the chemical weapons convention will be important to the success of the implementation of the convention. This analytical field cannot afford to stand aside from the research and development which lies at the very heart of science. Accordingly, method development will be one principal task of the future verification laboratories supporting the implementation of the convention. We nevertheless believe that the methods actually used for verification analyses will have to be approved by the Technical Secretariat in order to create confidence among States Parties that the results of the analyses do not vary from one laboratory to another. Recommended Operating Procedures, tested by all verification laboratories, could be used as the first choice in the analysis. In addition to the approved methods, the laboratories may well use methods they themselves have developed and found superior to the approved ones. Such new methods could, after due evaluation and testing, become Recommended Procedures. This approach would encourage the laboratories to improve their own methods with a view to getting them accepted as Recommended Procedures.

This principle of continuous development means that the future Technical Secretariat has to arrange the testing of new methods and get them approved as soon as possible. The merits of such testing are clearly demonstrated in the present round-robin test.

A compilation of Recommended Procedures would be invaluable to laboratories of countries without long experience in the analysis of chemical warfare agents but which should be able to acquire necessary technical competence to do verification analyses. This is important for the National Authorities for the implementation of the future convention and would also facilitate participation in the international verification as a designated laboratory. In this way recommended procedures could support wider geographical distribution of designated laboratories and universal adherence to the convention.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

I should like now to deal with another matter. I have held consultations with the Groups in the light of the wishes expressed by States non-Members to attend the informal meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 10 July, in which Ambassadors Richard Burt of the United States and Yuri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union will participate in their capacities as Heads of the Delegations to the Strategic Arms Talks. As a result of my consultations, I understand that there is consensus that the informal meeting scheduled for that date be open to all non-Members wishing to attend who have already been invited to participate in various activities relating to the work of the Conference. This means that all States non-Members which now have nameplates and reserved

(The President)

seats in this conference room will be able to take part in that meeting. Of course, it is understood that this invitation is extended in view of the special character of the informal meeting being held on 10 July. I should like now to put this recommendation before the Conference for decision. Is there any objection? I see none.

It was so decided.

The Secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairman of subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. I have in mind in that connection the consultations relating to an appropriate organizational framework for the consideration of agenda item 1, which might make it necessary for us to add to this timetable. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

Distinguished delegates, I am requested to announce that the open-ended consultations on radiological weapons scheduled for tomorrow, Friday, 6 July, at 3 p.m. will be held in room H-3, instead of Room I as originally envisaged.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 10 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.563
10 July 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-62035/3920a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 563rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

May I also note that the Conference will hold today after this plenary meeting an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, with the participation of the leaders of the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the Strategic Arms Talks.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to express the profound satisfaction of the Soviet delegation at the fact that you, Sir, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, have taken the Chair at our Conference. In disarmament circles Ambassador Sujka is known as an experienced diplomat and a major specialist on the questions making up the agenda of our forum and on military and political problems in general. We are convinced that, with your election as President, substantial progress will be made in the Conference on the subjects for discussion. It also gives me particular pleasure to welcome Ambassador Sujka as President of the Conference because of the traditional relations of friendship, and good-neighbourliness and alliance that there are between our countries and peoples. Today these relations have been placed on a reliable footing of consistent mutual respect, equal rights, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, freedom of social and political choice and other generally recognized principles and standards contained in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

One of the most remarkable features of the work of the Conference on Disarmament at this stage is that we have turned our eyes on ourselves, and that is no accident. The question of improving and, if you will, modernizing our forum is ripe for solution. The Conference must suit the needs of our times, the circumstances of our rapidly changing world. All the more so as it is the most representative and, hence, the only body of its kind, a unique disarmament negotiating forum.

By a peculiar irony of history, the Conference on Disarmament was set up during the "cold-war" years, where, in point of fact, the issue was not disarmament in the true sense of the term, but at the best arms control, i.e. the containment of the arms race in some areas without any serious attempts to

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

reverse it. At the same time, disarmament itself was often used for political profiteering and propaganda campaigns of all kinds. Inevitably, the spirit of the times influenced the work of the Conference, which at times became an arena for mutual recrimination and sterile confrontational polemics. This can be from leafing through its old records. Of course, no one disputes the achievements of the Conference and its predecessors. It has to its credit documents essential to the destiny of the world: treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on their non-deployment on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and conventions prohibiting bacteriological weapons and modification of the environment for military purposes. We are close to completing work on a convention banning chemical weapons. However, if the results of the work of the Conference are objectively and self-critically assessed, in accordance with today's exacting criteria, there is no way they can be called particularly successful. The last time an agreement was worked out within the framework of the Conference was in 1977. Since then the stocks of weapons on our planet, of course, have not diminished but have grown even further. There have emerged completely new problems relating to the spread of the arms race both into new technologies and into various regions of the world.

On the other hand, it is obvious that fundamentally new prospects for disarmament are now opening up. This has to do with the end of the post-war period of confrontation and with the emerging shift from a block model of security to a qualitatively different world in which relations between States are based on common, all-European and, in the longer term, universal structures and institutions.

We have been convinced yet again that events are indeed developing in this direction by the results of the London summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO countries. We consider the decisions adopted there as a positive response to the call made by the parties to the Warsaw Treaty to begin the process of transforming the two military alliances into political organizations and we see in them a readiness on the part of the NATO countries to put an end by joint efforts to the "cold war" and move on to a period of peace made stable and permanent. The NATO countries' proposals to the Warsaw Treaty States to establish contacts at various levels between the member States of the two alliances and to hold a regular meeting to discuss military doctrines and, of course, the proposal for the adoption of a joint declaration in which we would solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State deserve a positive rating. We welcome the proclaimed willingness of the NATO countries to conclude as soon as possible a treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe and then embark on negotiations on further reductions in such forces, as well as to open talks in the very near future on tactical

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nuclear weapons in Europe. That the beginning of these talks is tied to the attainment of a treaty on conventional armed forces should not cause objections because there is now, as is known, a general understanding of the need to conclude the Vienna talks as soon as possible.

We attach particularly great importance to the statement that the NATO countries have no aggressive intentions, are committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes and will never be the first to use force. Similar statements have been made in the past by Warsaw Treaty member States as well. This creates a fundamentally different political climate in Europe and, subject to the consistent implementation of these statements, could constitute a conceptual foundation for a new security system on the continent. So, there are very good possibilities in the world, but it has to be said that our Conference has not yet started truly and fully to use them.

What is the reason for this state of affairs? The question is a perfectly legitimate one and is of concern to all of those who are not indifferent to the problems of the day. But asking it is easier than answering it. Of course, one could look for culprits; that is always so to speak, the easy way out. We have our opinion on this score and so, no doubt, do others, and their view does not necessarily coincide with ours. However, such a search would probably be an exercise in futility. And it would hardly bring us any closer to accomplishing the task of enhancing the efficiency of our forum.

What is important is that there is now virtually consensus that this task - the task of enhancing efficiency - must be performed. And that, no doubt, requires looking at the problem in a broader context and trying first of all to determine the Conference's place in the process of disarmament in general.

The complexity of the problems that we have to solve stems from the fact that we are a multilateral forum dealing with global disarmament. Furthermore, tremendous differences can be seen not only between States' interests but also between the concrete situations in various regions. Here it is particularly hard to find common denominators. This is an objectively difficult task and it cannot be fully accomplished by remaining within the framework of the problem of disarmament, for disarmament - particularly global disarmament - is not an isolated process. Here there are bound up into one bundle both the problems of regional conflicts and such global "sore points" as development strategy, prevention of the spread of technologies facilitating the development of nuclear or chemical weapons, missiles or other arms, and the problems of strategic stability and global and regional military balances. Therefore, the resolution of the problems of global disarmament does not, of course, depend solely on the reform of the Conference.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

In this connection, another, unexpected question arises: is the Conference necessary at all and need it be improved? Perhaps there are enough bilateral and multilateral negotiating channels that come into being and will probably continue to come into being as problems arise?

We none the less believe that the Conference, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, is necessary. Furthermore, its importance will increase in the future because, if the progress being made at bilateral and multilateral regional disarmament negotiations, and which we welcome, is not confirmed on the global scale, it might in the end come to nothing, for the possibility will remain that the arms race might spill over into other regions of the world, "outflanking" the existing agreements. The military and political realities of our world are such that creating an "enclave of security", for instance in Europe, will be impossible if the potential for instability and weapons stockpiles grow outside its boundaries. In the final analysis, security is indivisible.

That global multilateral disarmament negotiations are really possible is shown by the work on the banning of chemical weapons. It represents the first, experiment of its kind, and consequently an especially valuable one, an experiment in thrashing out answers to literally all the questions in a truly multilateral organ. Going together with it, and, as we see it, going together not badly on the whole, are the bilateral Soviet-United States efforts. As yet there is no other experience of the close co-existence of multilateral and bilateral negotiations. All in all, the negotiations on chemical weapons have already yielded many useful lessons for negotiating theory and practice, lessons that it still remains to understand.

Unfortunately, on many other items of the Conference's agenda there is still no unanimity even as regards the topics and goals of the negotiations, but that does not mean that unanimity cannot be achieved at all. The search for points of convergence is one of the main tasks of the Conference on Disarmament and to a large extent determines its raison d'etre.

The Conference on Disarmament is also a suitable forum for discussions on how to impart greater dynamism to the process of disarmament, how to make it more comprehensive, purposeful and conducive to the creation in the world of a stable situation in which the threat of war would be reduced to a minimum and ultimately eliminated. For in the final analysis disarmament is not an end in itself, but merely one of the means of building a secure world.

In this connection, the need to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference is today more pressing than ever before. We consider this to mean giving the Conference additional capability to identify and seek to resolve problems. With this in mind, we believe that we should move towards greater flexibility and at the same time greater discipline.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

A start could be made with relatively simple measures on which, to our mind, areas of agreement and mutual understanding are already coming to light. In our view, these include the proposal by the Western Group to change our forum's schedule of work. In principle the Soviet delegation supports this proposal. It would enable the time to be used more rationally and would also create additional possibilities for consultations and preparation of new instructions. Of course, the significance of this measure should not be overestimated and its adoption should not put a stop to the reform of the Conference. But if we approved it in the very near future, that would be a first step towards establishing better conditions for reinvigorating the work of the Conference in general.

We appreciate that to solve all the problems of improving the work of the Conference at one blow, as the saying has it, is impossible. Numerous questions and proposals are not yet ripe for solution. Here, obviously, the continuity of the process in general will inevitably be accompanied by something of a step-by-step approach. As a contribution to our discussions, I would like to express some ideas on this issue.

First of all, we believe that the rule of consensus should be maintained. The question of this rule arises most often in connection with the establishment of ad hoc committees and their mandates. That is understandable. But it can hardly be expected that if we decide to hold negotiations on a particular problem against a State's will that State will then happily accept the talks and take part in them. At all events, we will not get any final result that way. Moreover, consensus is a kind of guarantee of equal rights for all the members of the Conference regardless of any one State's military significance and of political schemes.

All the same, some changes might be made in the procedure for setting up the working bodies. First, we might look into the question of not repeating every year the procedure of setting up an ad hoc committee with a particular mandate if the committee has already been established once. Let the work continue until the mandate is fulfilled. At the same time, a clearly-delimited two-week period might be set aside at the beginning of each winter session to review all the mandates. If there was no agreement on a new mandate, that would mean that the previous one was still valid. Of course, during the rest of the time it would be possible to hold informal consultations concerning mandates, as was recently done, for example, under the leadership of Ambassador Donowaki in connection with the searches for agreement concerning agenda item 1.

Second, the membership of the ad hoc committees need not necessarily correspond 100 per cent to that of the Conference. A more flexible approach is possible here, based on States' interest in work in specific areas. However, it is important that all the members of the Conference should be in

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agreement in principle with the carrying out of the work. Generally speaking, the Conference should have the possibility of changing the membership and functions of its working bodies depending on the tasks at hand.

It would also be a good idea to provide for the participation of all interested States in the negotiating process on an equal footing. To that end, thought might be given to making the rights of observers in ad hoc committees equal to those of members of the Conference, or, in any event, to doing so in those ad hoc committees which have negotiating mandates. We also believe that, once we have accepted someone as an observer, there is no need to reconsider that decision every year. In saying this, of course, we proceed from the belief that neither the Conference nor its working bodies should be turned into mere places of passage.

Another very important question is how effectively we use our time. Frankly, the Secretariat's figures for the time we have lost through late starting and early adjournment of meetings do not worry me very much, although maybe we do all need more self-discipline in this respect. The fact is, however, that sometimes talks in the corridors before or after a meeting are more important than the work at the meeting itself, and there is nothing wrong with that. A broader approach is needed to the problem of the allocation and effective use of time, in an effort to get both more precise time-limits and greater flexibility.

The present practice is for us to cover each and every agenda item in the course of a session. During the summer sessions, in particular all the ad hoc committees that have been established function on a formal basis. How they function is another matter. Delegations, even the biggest ones, are not in a position to cover all these areas properly.

Would it not be better to vary the time for the discussion of specific issues? Or at any rate, not to deal with everything at once? Besides, reorganizing work in this way would be a factor of discipline. For example, if delegations knew that the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space was planning to sit in, say, May-June, they would get relevant instructions ready by that time. During the rest of the time the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee could hold consultations with delegations. In general, in any one session - especially if they are to be shorter than at present - attention should be concentrated on substantive work on not more than two or three issues. Apart from everything else, that would make possible better planning of experts' participation and, perhaps, reduce delegations expenditure in connection with the stay of experts in Geneva. Of course, in the present circumstances the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should sit without any time-limits.

About plenary meetings: there are two many of them. At the beginning of the winter session, as a rule there is a great rush of speakers, which is an argument for keeping to the present practice for that period, say for two

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weeks. During the rest of the time, except, perhaps, for the last two weeks of the summer session, there could be formal plenary meetings once a week. That would make it possible to hold more informal meetings. But here again, I think, we should not chase after figures. The Soviet delegation suggests that thought should be given to how to increase the yield from this informal "pre-negotiating" form of work which - if it is well organized - would make it possible to have a frank exchange of views on the positions, concerns and security factors lying at the basis of States' approaches. In our view, it would be helpful if the informal meetings on any given topic were held during specifically agreed periods of time as well. The work at them could be guided not by the regular President of the Conference, but by a specially designated co-ordinator.

Finally, the main question: what should the Conference deal with? Should the agenda be changed? This is perhaps the most difficult question. On the one hand, especially taking into account the way we implement it in practice, the present agenda may seem obsolete. However, I would not be in a hurry to draw practical conclusions.

The agenda is quite comprehensive. I am sure that many things, although not everything, can be done within the framework of the present agenda. Some of the items, for example, nuclear test ban and chemical weapons, are sufficiently concrete. Others, however, are extremely broad.

Take, for example, nuclear disarmament. What is there to talk about here? We shall probably not manage now to begin talks on complete nuclear disarmament. Perhaps this topic should be made more concrete?

We have already talked about the problem of ending the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. A no less important problem is that of the non-use for military purposes of nuclear materials which become available as a result of nuclear disarmament agreements. As a first step, we could discuss appropriate machinery for monitoring this measure and start scientific and technical investigation of the possibilities of using such material for peaceful purposes.

Prevention of nuclear war is too broad a topic. Perhaps we should try to split it into more concrete components and, as a result, come at the actual directions of work?

One of those directions, in our view, might be the discussion of the idea of a multilateral agreement between all the nuclear Powers on measures to reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, as well as on the establishment of national nuclear risk reduction centres by all the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

We should not forget about the so-called "decalogue", which in essence is the Conference's mandate and the potential of which we have simply not yet explored.

We view with interest the suggestions to consider naval problems at the Conference. The USSR delegation has already expressed itself on the nuclear aspects of these problems. The topic is a special one. But it is time to begin talking about it more broadly too. Let this work be informal, so to say "prenegotiating" in nature. There is no need to speed up the course of events. To begin with we might make a sort of inventory of the problems and suggestions in this area and then concentrate on working out measures for stability, predictability and mutual understanding in naval matters, without touching for the while on questions of fleet structure and size. The ideas of an international agreement on guarantees for international maritime communications and an international agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea deserve attention.

Confidence-building measures in a broad sense also possibly represent a promising direction. One of the systematizing factors of a secure world is the establishment of a ramified infrastructure of measures for confidence and transparency covering various types of military activity and various regions, possibly with regional particularities.

Consideration of the question of limiting the use for military purposes of scientific and technical achievements could become a major independent direction of the work of our Conference. Here a start might be made by working out measures for monitoring and openness in this area, including development of the concept and practice of establishing open laboratories, extensive joint research and development in military and technical fields, the organization of on-site inspections of the use made of transferred technology, etc.

Lastly, why not consider regional disarmament measures?

There remain on the agenda of the Conference a number of old, seemingly futureless items. Naturally, there is a temptation simply to strike them off. But in our view there is no sense in hurrying here either. It would be better to try to take a fresh look at them and to weigh up in the light of the new political realities that are emerging what the Conference on Disarmament could do. For our part, we will think about this and we call on everyone to join us in this creative exercise.

One of these issues is, for example, the prohibition of radiological weapons. Although there are at last some signs of progress in the so-called "traditional direction", things are at a standstill as regards the prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations. Perhaps an attempt should be made

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

to discuss this second problem in another forum or in a separate working body of the Conference on Disarmament with the participation of those who would be interested in that.

In conclusion, literally one comment on the formal membership and the issue of expanding the Conference. Our preference is for the rapid application of the 1+1+2 formula for expansion. We agreed on that formula long ago and until recently no one had any doubts about it. The task that has already been set should be completed. Then a wider look could be taken at the problem of expanding the Conference and its membership in the new historical circumstances.

These are the considerations I wanted to share with you today, distinguished colleagues. Perhaps not everything in them is beyond dispute but we do not claim to hold a monopoly on truth. We are ready to study counter-suggestions with the greatest good will. I also think that in this matter it is important for all of us not to disregard possible advice from the secretariat of the Conference, which is composed of experienced and devoted staff. In short, our aim is to facilitate the development of a process that would ultimately make the Conference more useful to each of the States participating in it and to the international community in general.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As announced earlier, the Conference will hold after this plenary meeting an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, with the participation of the negotiators in the bilateral Strategic Arms Talks. May I suggest that we adjourn this plenary meeting now and convene the informal meeting in five minutes' time.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 July, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.564
12 July 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Boqumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-62080/3951a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 564th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On behalf of the Conference and myself, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable William Waldegrave, M.P. The Minister already addressed the Conference on 15 June last year, when he introduced document CD/921, concerning some preliminary results of the United Kingdom programme of trial challenge inspections on chemical weapons. His political career is well known to us, as he has held positions of responsibility in the British Government since 1981. Since his last visit to the Conference, his portfolio at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has substantially increased. In addition to arms control, disarmament and defence affairs, he now has charge of relations between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, East-West relations including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and all of Africa. In January this year, he was made a member of the Privy Council. I should like to thank him for being with us again today and for the interest that he shows in our work.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I now give the floor to the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable William Waldegrave, M.P.

Mr. WALDEGRAVE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, thank you very much indeed for your kind introduction, and it is indeed good to be back with the Conference on Disarmament once more. I am delighted, if I may say so, to be here at the time of your presidency. Poland and the United Kingdom have a long history of close relations and, as my statement will mainly concern the chemical weapons negotiations, it is particularly appropriate to make it under the presidency of an Ambassador who has twice filled with such distinction the post of Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Since my visit to the Conference on Disarmament last year, there have been dramatic changes to the political landscape of Europe. I cannot claim that all of them were the result of the increase in my responsibilities at the Foreign Office, but it has certainly been a most fascinating time to have some small part in these events.

These changes were reflected in the Declaration issued in London last week by the NATO summit meeting. This was widely reported in our press and elsewhere, I think, as marking the end of the cold war. As the Declaration said, "The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing ... Europeans are determining their own destiny ... They are choosing freedom ... They are choosing peace".

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

This improved political climate has already given rise to significant progress in arms control. Much progress has been made towards completing a START agreement. An agreement on limiting conventional arms in Europe has been given high priority. Further conventional arms limitations are envisaged.

Negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces are expected shortly after an agreement on conventional forces is signed. And once those negotiations are under way, NATO will propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

So there is an air of optimism in Europe and an expectation of rapid progress in both conventional and nuclear arms control.

The recent United States/Soviet bilateral agreement on chemical weapons is a significant and welcome advance. It should give a new impetus to the multilateral negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament.

But most would say that, in contrast to the other arms control negotiations I have mentioned, the search for a multilateral global chemical weapons ban has already taken too long.

We have to look back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the last multilateral agreement on chemical weapons. That treaty governed use in war only, not production or possession.

Recent years have seen a spread of chemical weapons. More countries now possess these weapons than since 1945.

There was one major conflict in the 1980s (the Gulf War) in which chemical weapons were used on a greater scale than in any conflict since the First World War. The leader of one country recently boasted of his possession of new binary weapons.

Has the genie escaped the bottle? Can we still achieve a global chemical weapons ban? Do enough countries actually want a convention? Or are we engaged here in an elaborate charade, going through the motions without affecting the main issues? A process which produces an ever longer and more complex "rolling text", but which leaves the key problems unsolved?

Talks have been going on in Geneva about a chemical weapons ban since the 1960s. First in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, then in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and since 1979 in this body. The negotiations have lasted a quarter of a century. We politicians have the duty to ask: why so long? Why haven't the problems been resolved? Why can't chemical weapons match the success of other arms control negotiations? Are these talks dead on their feet or are they going somewhere?

Those of us around this table must believe there is hope, and that it lies here in the Conference on Disarmament, the only forum for global arms control negotiations. We look to multilateral diplomacy to deliver the goods. The United Kingdom view can be stated simply. Anything less than world-wide agreement on chemical weapons would not address the whole problem. But it is not simply a question of negotiating more productively here. There are practical problems which require detailed investigation by member States.

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

Of course, I am aware of the enormous efforts made in the Conference on Disarmament to resolve the extremely difficult problems presented by chemical weapons. I do not underestimate the commitment and will to succeed of those involved here.

One thing is very clear. We must not take the easy way out: we must not follow the example offered by the Biological Weapons Convention of an agreement without effective verification. If a declaratory agreement could meet our concerns, we could agree on a text today. But that would leave the underlying security concerns about chemical weapons unaffected and unresolved.

So, in approaching these talks, we are seeking reassurance that all parties will abide by the terms of the convention. That reassurance must be clear and reliable.

For this reason in our view verification is the top priority. An effective verification régime is crucial for the convention to work.

And challenge inspection is the key to effective verification. There are two reasons for this. The first is the secrecy and evasion traditionally surrounding chemical weapons. Many possessors of chemical weapons have yet to own up. How many countries represented here believe that the three States which have acknowledged their possession of chemical weapons are the whole story? The second reason is the lack of distinctive signature for chemical-weapons-related facilities and systems. If there was such clarity, then chemical weapons would be as recognizable as, say, a tank or aircraft. We could then recognize, count, measure, weigh and in other ways assess the effectiveness, the military value of chemical weapons. But we cannot do this with confidence.

We need therefore a rigorous, wide-ranging verification mechanism covering undeclared as well as declared facilities as a safety net to provide confidence in treaty compliance by signatories. An unverifiable convention would be worthless.

Challenge inspection is the key to effective verification. Yet there are concerns about the implication for national security. Can challenge inspection be effective without putting at risk unrelated national secrets? I think the answer is in the affirmative.

The United Kingdom approach has been to put the feasibility of challenge inspection to the test. We believe the only way to get a convincing answer is to practice the procedures in as realistic a way as possible.

The detailed two-year programme of six trial inspections at United Kingdom Government-owned facilities covered some of our most sensitive security installations, including nuclear-weapons storage, nuclear-weapons research, development and manufacture, and a sensitive communications centre. We asked ourselves the hard questions. What would be the implications for physical security? Would inspections reveal the presence and location of sensitive non-chemical weapons stores? Would they compromise information on

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(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

non-chemical weapon stock-holding, throughput and capacity? Would they give access to classified weapon-design details, especially to nuclear-weapon design information? These are all difficult problems. But we think solutions have been found.

The paper I am tabling today as CD/1012 describes the main lessons from a very extensive work programme. We discovered that: managed access is the key to a balance between the protection of legitimate security interests and the degree of intrusiveness necessary for effective verification; there is no United Kingdom site so sensitive from the national-security viewpoint that we could not allow some form of access within the site, appropriately managed, to an international inspection team under the provisions on challenge inspection of a chemical weapons convention.

In short, the results of our research so far indicate that, as we say in English, "you can have your cake and eat it". But we also recognize that more practical research is needed.

Managed access within the site provides the solution. It is a process of negotiation about how best to demonstrate compliance between inspectors and inspected, which gives the former the access they need and the latter the protection they require. It provides a wide spectrum of techniques. They range from simple shrouding to rigorous methods of protection. Our trials allowed us to develop new techniques. One of these, a system of selective access, is described in some detail in our paper. We found it useful in a number of potentially difficult situations.

On the final form of challenge inspection, we think a challenge inspection régime should be capable of addressing any serious concerns about declared or undeclared facilities: there should be no sanctuary sites, safe from inspection. Challenge inspection should therefore be a regular element of the verification régime; it need not necessarily carry the assumption that the convention is being breached. For this reason, too, we should find a less combative title for this procedure, as others have suggested. "Inspection on request" is the obvious option.

We are conscious that the challenge inspection régime for the chemical weapons convention goes further, and is more all-embracing, than for any other arms control agreements. This is inconvenient, but also unavoidable if chemical weapons verification is to work.

Let me add a word about what challenge inspection is not. It is not a licence to spy. Nor is it a device to uncover commercial secrets. The inspection team have no automatic right to be told what actually goes on in any plant they visit. They may leave at the end of the inspection none the wiser about the nature of the activity or the product of the plant inspected. The inspectors' role is limited to satisfying themselves that, whatever else may be produced or stored on the site, the provisions of the chemical weapons convention are not being violated.

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

As I have said, we do not pretend to have all the answers. More work is needed on some aspects. Civil chemical plants were not included in our programme. Others may have particular concerns not fully addressed in our work.

We have been encouraged by reports from other States which are also undertaking trial challenge inspections. In many respects our experiences point in similar directions.

I hope the British paper will help provide a basis on which to build consensus on this key issue. The way will then be much clearer to resolve remaining issues.

I hope other member States too will carry this work forward as quickly as possible. If you doubt our findings, go and do the practical inspections for yourself and report back here to the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, I would make an appeal for no more appeals. Too often we have heard that greater political commitment by parties concerned could bring these negotiations to speedy conclusion. Of course we want a convention, an effective convention, as soon as possible. But many of the remaining answers can only be found through research, investigation and trails not here, but in relevant facilities, both military and civil, in the territory of member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

This work should go ahead quickly. The clearest signal of political commitment to a chemical weapons convention that any State can give is to involve itself in this work back at home and to present concrete results here.

Verification is the key, and challenge inspection is the key to verification. Once we can resolve all the problems of challenge inspection, the long-sought goal of a verifiable chemical weapons convention will be in sight.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his important statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair.

I should like now to ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. The timetable has been

(The President)

prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of subsidiary bodies and as usual is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.